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Tax Protestors and Penalties: Ensuring Perceived 
Fairness and Mitigating Systemic Costs 
Danshera Cords ∗
“For voluntary self-assessment to be both meaningful and productive of 
revenues, the citizens must not only have confidence in the fairness of the 
tax laws, but also in the uniform and vigorous enforcement of these 
laws.”1
I. INTRODUCTION 
Each year hundreds of thousands of taxpayers use abusive schemes 
to avoid paying some or all of their federal income taxes.2 Tax avoidance 
schemes include abusive tax shelters, fraudulent transactions, and 
 ∗ Associate Professor of Law, Academic Director of Graduate Law Programs, Capital 
University Law School; LL.M. in Taxation 2000, New York University School of Law; J.D. 1998, 
Seattle University School of Law; B.A. 1991, University of Washington. I would like to thank Karen 
S. Dean, Brant J. Hellwig, Donald A. Hughes Jr., Jeffrey Kahn, Marvin C. Kloeppel, Leandra 
Lederman, and the participants of the Ohio Legal Scholars Workshop: Christopher Bryant, Regina 
Burch, Charles Cohen, Benjamin Davis, Mark Godsey, Kenneth Katkin, Michael Mannheimer, 
Susan Rozelle, and Angela Upchurch for their helpful and insightful comments on earlier drafts of 
this article. Any errors or omissions are, of course, my own. I would also like to thank Capital 
University Law School for its financial support. 
 1. John F. Kennedy, U.S. President, Special Message to the Congress on Taxation (Apr. 20, 
1961), quoted in Mortimer Caplin, The State of IRS Administration and Our Tax System in General, 
103 TAX NOTES 473, 473 (2004). 
 2. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE EFFORTS TO 
IDENTIFY AND COMBAT ABUSIVE TAX SCHEMES HAVE INCREASED, BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN, 
GAO-02-733, at 2 (2002). In tax-year 2000, approximately 740,000 returns were filed using one 
abusive scheme or another. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 
ENHANCED EFFORTS TO COMBAT ABUSIVE TAX SHELTERS—CHALLENGES REMAIN, GAO-02-618T, 
at 1 (Testimony of Michael Brostek, Director, Tax Issues (2002)). In 2001, at least 152,000 
individual income tax returns were filed by tax protestors. David Cay Johnston, U.S. Discloses That 
Use of Tax Evasion Plans Is Extensive, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2002, at C4 (citing Justice Department 
estimates of returns filed falsely claiming no taxes were due or using abusive schemes to receive a 
refund); see also Testimony of Micheal Brostek, supra at 6 (noting that 62,000 frivolous returns, 
105,000 frivolous refund claims, and 65,000 abuse domestic trusts were claimed in 2000, for a total 
loss to the Treasury of $6.8 billion). Because this number includes only filed returns, it does not 
include individuals who failed or refused to file a tax return. In addition, more than 1,500 businesses 
refuse to withhold taxes from their employees, some claiming that income taxes are voluntary. Id.; 
David Cay Johnston, Boast of Refusal to Pay Taxes Leads to 27-Count Indictment, N.Y. TIMES, June 
22, 2003, at A1. 
2CORDS.FIN.DOC 3/14/2006 5:16:09 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2005 
1516 
approaches based on an erroneous belief that the federal tax system 
either is illegitimate or is inapplicable to certain taxpayers. Those who 
believe that the tax system is illegal or inapplicable are commonly 
referred to as tax protestors. The following excerpt is typical of the 
written statements that tax protestors include frequently with their tax 
returns and court filings: 
[THE TAXPAYER], UPON PRESENTMENT BY INTERNAL 
REVENUE, RETURNED AND REFUSED FOR CAUSE UCC 
3-501 SAID PRESENTMENTS WITHOUT DISHONOR. IN 
ADDITION, [THE TAXPAYER], IS NOT A “U.S. CITIZEN” 
NEITHER IS HE A ‘RESIDENT NOR INHABITANT’ OF 
THE U.S. AND HAS NO INCOME EFFECTIVELY 
CONNECTED WITH THE UNITED STATES THAT [THE 
TAXPAYER] DID NOT KNOWINGLY OR VOLUNTARILY 
ENTER INTO ANY AGREEMENT OR CONTRACT TO BE 
LIABLE FOR THE NATIONAL DEBT, OR ‘ELECTED’ TO 
BE TREATED AS A RESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
UNDER 26 CFR PART 5h; 26 USC, SECTION 6013(g) & (h) BY 
THE SIGNING OF FORM 1040 OR OTHER RELATED U.S. 
FORMS. [THE TAXPAYER] IS NOT A PARTY TO ANY 
TRANSACTION WITH THE U.S. LET THE U.S. PRODUCE 
THE ORIGINAL SIGNED CONTRACT [SEC.] 871 4(b) 
FURTHER PETITIONER SAYETH NOT.3
Fortunately, most people in the United States pay their taxes when 
and in the amount required. Between eighty and eighty-five percent of all 
taxes owed are timely paid.4 Most Americans believe that tax 
 
 3. Nagy v. Comm’r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 1854, 1854–55 (1996) (quoting from the taxpayer’s 
petition) (capitals in original). 
 4. See, e.g., NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE’S REPORT TO CONGRESS: FISCAL YEAR 2006 
OBJECTIVES 6 (2005); Steve Johnson, The 1998 Act and the Resources Link Between Tax 
Compliance and Tax Simplification, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1013, 1015 (2003); Leandra Lederman, The 
Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1459 (2003) 
[hereinafter Lederman, Interplay]; Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the Reformed IRS, 51 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 971, 973 (2003) [hereinafter Lederman, The Reformed IRS]; James Andreoni, Brian 
Erard & Johnathan Feinstein, Tax Compliance, 36 J. Econ. Lit. 818, 819 (1998). In fact, the tax 
compliance rate is even higher for amounts subject to mandatory withholding. The compliance rate 
for wage earners is estimated to be up to 98%, perhaps reflecting the relative lack of opportunity to 
avoid compliance. The Reformed IRS, supra at 975–76; Phil Brand, IRS’s Worker Classification 
Program—An Inside Look at New Ways to Resolve the Problems, 85 J. Tax’n 17, 19 (1996) (citing 
unpublished IRS data suggesting that the compliance rate for wage earners may exceed 98%). For 
groups not subject to withholding, an estimated 42% of the tax due is voluntarily paid. Lederman, 
The Reformed IRS, supra at 976. 
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compliance is an important element of patriotism and personal integrity.5 
Compliance is important because when individuals and businesses fail to 
pay their taxes when due, compliant taxpayers must bear more than their 
fair share of the costs of government services. Moreover, businesses and 
sole proprietors that avoid or evade their tax obligations may be more 
competitive than their tax compliant counterparts because tax avoiders 
have lower costs. 
Successful tax avoidance by some can undermine the confidence that 
compliant taxpayers have that the tax system fairly distributes its burden 
among all those who benefit from government services. Maintaining a 
high rate of compliance, however, requires that noncompliance have 
consequences.6 Unless there are significant consequences to tax 
noncompliance, compliant taxpayers view the tax system as unfair 
because they are forced to assume more than their share of the tax 
burden.7
A subset of the larger group of tax avoiders are tax protestors. Tax 
protestors use frivolous and illegitimate arguments against the obligatory 
nature of government assessed taxes to justify their refusal to pay their 
taxes. Tax protestor schemes are often promoted in seminars, in books, 
and on the Internet.8 The increased number of tax protestors may be 
attributable in part to the expansion of the Internet and the ease with 
which it allows tax protestors to spread their message. Although tax 
protestors constitute only a small percentage of all taxpayers, they are 
extremely vocal and are growing in number;9 the number of tax protestor 
 5. In response to the statement “[i]t is every American’s civic duty to pay their fair share of 
taxes,” 94% of the individuals surveyed in the 2004 Taxpayer Attitude Survey responded that they 
either “Completely Agree” (73%) or “Mostly Agree” (21%). INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 
OVERSIGHT BOARD, 2004 TAXPAYER ATTITUDE SURVEY, at 5, 
http://www.treas.gov/irsob/documents/release040405.pdf. Similarly, 91% of the respondents 
identified personal integrity as providing “[a] great deal of influence” (79%) or being “[s]omewhat 
of an influence” (12%) on their tax compliance. Id. at 7. 
 6. Lederman, Interplay, supra note 4. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See infra Section II; see also Testimony of Michael Brostek, supra note 3, at 2; Johnston, 
infra note 9. 
 9. David Cay Johnston, Another Tax Denier Will Have His Day in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
19, 2005, at C2. 
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returns filed increased from 7,123 in 197910 to 18,226 in 198011 and to 
more than 152,000 in 2001.12
Individuals who are dissatisfied with the government and its policies 
are more likely to be convinced that the tax system is illegitimate than 
are individuals who are satisfied with the government and its policies.13 
An even greater concern is the possibility that growing numbers of tax 
protestors will be deleterious to tax compliance. General tax compliance 
may be adversely affected by a perception or reality that others are 
successfully avoiding payment of part or all of their tax liability.14
As the number of tax protestors increases, the costs associated with 
collecting their taxes and prosecuting their tax avoidance also increase. 
To prevent compliant taxpayers from unfairly bearing these costs, these 
costs should be shifted back to the tax protestors. Although this approach 
would be inappropriate if it was applied to all tax disputes, it is 
nevertheless appropriate to shift the costs to tax protestors whose truly 
frivolous positions waste administrative and judicial resources. 
Addressing the challenges raised by tax protestors who actively 
avoid their tax obligations increases the cost of tax collection. Although 
it would be possible to simply ignore all of the frivolous tax-protestor 
claims, tax protestor contentions must be reviewed. Even someone who 
does not acknowledge the government’s power to collect taxes can have 
a legitimate challenge to the amount that the Internal Revenue Service 
(“IRS” or “the Service”) asserts is the correct tax liability. If the courts 
and the Service dismiss all tax protestor claims without any 
consideration, some legitimate claims will be missed, which may reduce 
the public confidence in the fairness of the overall tax system eventually 
 10. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, ILLEGAL TAX PROTESTERS THREATEN 
TAX SYSTEM, GGD-81-83 app. II, at 46 (1981) (citing IRS statistics on tax protestor returns). 
 11. Id. 
 12. See supra note 2. 
 13. See Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Protest, “A Homosexual,” and Frivolity: A 
Deconstructionist Meditation, 24 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 21 n.24 (2005); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, 
Legitimacy and the Right of Revolution: The Role of Tax Protests and Anti-Tax Rhetoric in America, 
50 BUFF. L. REV. 819, 906–07 (2002) [hereinafter Kornhauser, Legitimacy]; Marjorie E. Kornhauser, 
For God and Country: Taxing Conscience, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 939, 942 [hereinafter Kornhauser, 
Taxing Conscience]; Christopher S. Jackson, Comment, The Inane Gospel of Tax Protest: Resist 
Rendering Unto Caesar—Whatever His Demands, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 291 (1996–1997); Thomas J. 
Purcell, III, An Analysis of the Formation of Federal Tax Policy, 18 CREIGHTON L. REV. 653, 654–
55 (1984–1985); Beryl N. Simpson, Constitutional Protection for Creative Tax Shelter Promoters: 
Ninth Circuit Restricts the Government’s Arsenal of Power—United States v. Dahlstrom, 713 F.2d 
1423 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2363 (1984), 59 WASH. L. REV. 927, 943 n.103 (1984). 
 14. See infra Part II.B. 
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reducing tax compliance. In addition, some inarticulate taxpayers with 
legitimate claims could be incorrectly identified as tax protestors, and in 
such cases dismissal without review would mean that legitimate claims 
would not be considered. 
This Article argues that tax protestors impose significant, 
unwarranted costs on tax administration, and tax protestors are neither 
adequately deterred nor sufficiently punished under the current 
framework of civil and criminal penalties. This Article proposes that 
taxpayers putting forth identified tax protestor positions in support of a 
contention that an individual or entity is not subject to taxation should be 
required to pay a penalty equal to the costs incurred by the Service and 
the courts to collect legitimate tax liabilities.15 In the interest of 
consistent treatment of similarly situated taxpayers and increasing the 
perceived fairness of the tax collection system, the penalty must be 
mandatory rather than discretionary. This penalty would effectively shift 
the costs of tax noncompliance from the compliant taxpayer back to the 
tax protestor who caused the cost in the first place. 
This Article begins with an overview of the problem of tax 
noncompliance. Section A of Part II discusses the scope of the problem, 
and Section B discusses why some taxpayers comply while others do not. 
Part III evaluates the rhetoric and arguments of tax protestors and 
concludes that these arguments, which the courts have uniformly 
rejected, cannot be disregarded without harming the perceived fairness of 
the tax system and without adversely impacting tax compliance rates.16
Part IV discusses the collection process and taxpayer rights, which 
include the rights created by the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring 
and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 1998).17 Part IV also considers how these 
rights may increase the perception of fairness yet also impose significant 
costs on the tax system when abused by tax protestors. 
 15. This Article does not address tax underpayment resulting from aggressive positions. 
While such positions are of concern to the government and are often abusive, aggressive taxpayers 
usually acknowledge the legitimacy of government tax collection. Approaches designed to increase 
aggressive taxpayers’ compliance rates will likely differ from approaches that increase tax protestor 
compliance and prevent the conversion of others to the tax protestor movement. Thus, the same 
approaches are unlikely to be successful in addressing these very different reasons for 
noncompliance. 
 16. Tax protestors frequently use quotations and excerpts out of context. See, e.g., Bell v. 
United States, 414 F.3d 474, 477 (3d Cir. 2005). To the extent that mainstream taxpayers buy in to 
these arguments and begin to refuse to pay taxes, tax compliance will be harmed. 
 17. Pub. L. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998) (codified as amended in various sections of 26 
U.S.C.) [hereinafter RRA 1998]. 
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Part V discusses the current penalty structure, with an emphasis on 
the civil penalties available for taking and promoting frivolous positions. 
This Part also discusses recent proposals to discourage or penalize 
protestor behavior. 
Part VI argues that a different approach to penalizing tax protestors 
is needed because the current penalty structure does not effectively deter 
tax protestor behavior. This Part proposes that nondiscretionary penalties 
equal to the cost of collecting taxes from tax protestors would increase 
the public’s perception of fairness and minimize the likelihood that 
currently compliant taxpayers may cease to comply with their tax 
obligations. 
This Article does not argue that citizens should not question the 
government, its powers, its programs, or its actions. The refusal to pay 
legitimate taxes is distinguishable from the use of legal methods to 
change the law including speaking out against the government or 
petitioning the government to change its policies.18 This Article 
addresses the deleterious impact that tax protestors’ unlawful actions can 
have on compliant taxpayers and suggests a means by which that impact 
can be overcome. 
II. TAX COMPLIANCE 
A high rate of tax compliance is essential to the operation of the 
government. Without efficient collection of tax revenues, the government 
cannot function. While most people comply with their tax obligations 
with little resistance, not all people pay their taxes voluntarily or on time. 
This Section discusses the scope of the problem of noncompliance, as 
well as the reasons that have been proffered to explain both tax 
compliance and tax noncompliance. 
 18. State initiatives have been very successful in limiting the ability of state governments to 
raise taxes. In California, Proposition 13 limited the ability of the government to levy property taxes. 
Tom Kenworthy, Colorado Wrestles with Proposal to Overhaul Tax Limits, USA TODAY Oct. 27, 
2005, at A10. In Washington State, ballot measures have limited increases in government spending 
and have reduced the taxes that could be collected for registering an automobile. See, e.g., Mark 
Trahant, Is I-695 A Chance to Reshape Government, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 11, 1999, at A2 
(discussing in part the passage of I-695 which reduced the amount the state could charge for vehicle 
licenses to $30); James L. McIntire, No Easy Answers in Choosing the Next Governor, Voters Must 
Be Wary of Candidates with Simplistic Solutions to Balancing the Budget, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 15, 1996, at D1 (discussing I-601 which limited spending and tax increases). 
In addition, angry citizens challenging taxes and government regulations are recurring themes in the 
United States. Kornhauser, Taxing Conscience, supra note 13, at 940; Thompson Smith, Note, The 
Patriot Movement: Refreshing the Tree of Liberty with Fertilizer Bombs and the Blood of Martyrs, 
32 VAL. U. L. REV. 269, 269 (1997). 
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A. The Scope of the Tax Gap 
All governments require a steady source of revenue, requiring 
efficient tax collection. In times of budget deficits, effective tax 
collection is even more important. Although tax compliance in the 
United States is estimated to be between eighty and eighty-five 
percent,19 recent estimates of unpaid taxes put the amount at between 
$312 and $353 billion each year.20 This is the gross tax gap21 and is 
comprised of nonfiling, underreporting, and underpaying.22 To compare, 
the tax gap is approximately equal to the amount that the federal 
government pays each year for Medicare23 or the 2005 federal budget 
deficit.24 Examined another way, the tax gap increases the tax burden on 
every compliant individual taxpayer by $2,000.25
Enforcement efforts, including audits, liens, and levies, are used to 
reduce the tax gap. In 2001, for example, the net tax gap, which is the 
difference between the amount of tax owed and the amount of tax 
 19. Preliminary results from the National Research Program, the first effort to collect 
taxpayer data since 1989, indicated that the 2001 voluntary compliance rate was approximately 
eighty-five percent. NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE’S REPORT TO CONGRESS: FISCAL YEAR 2006 
OBJECTIVES 6 (2005); see also Johnson, supra note 4, at 1015. However, others interpret the 
preliminary results of the National Research Program to show compliance rate to be significantly 
higher. Robert E. Brown & J. Mazur, The National Research Program: Measuring Taxpayer 
Compliance Comprehensively, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1255, 1258 (2003) (estimating ninety-eight 
percent voluntary compliance on individual income tax returns in recent years). These discrepancies 
demonstrate the difficultly in measuring compliance as adequate data is unavailable. Susan B. Long 
& Judyth A. Swingen, Taxpayer Compliance: Setting New Agendas for Research, 25 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 637, 655 (1991). 
 20. New IRS Study Provides Preliminary Tax Gap Estimate, I.R.S. News Release IR-2005-38 
(March 29, 2005); see also George K. Yin, JCT Chief Discusses the Tax Gap, 107 TAX NOTES 1449 
(2005) (discussing ways to close the tax gap). 
 21. New IRS Study Provides Preliminary Tax Gap Estimate, supra note 20; Yin, supra note 
20. 
 22. New IRS Study Provides Preliminary Tax Gap Estimate, supra note 20. IRS National 
Headquarters Office of Research, Tax Gap Map for Year 2001 (Feb. 24, 2004), cited in NATIONAL 
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERVICE, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 211 (estimating the net tax 
gap, the gross tax gap reduced by the amount ultimately collected, to be $255 billion a year). 
Underreported tax liabilities account for eighty percent (approximately $249 to $311 billion) of the 
gross tax gap. Id. at 214. 
 23. Yin, supra note 20, at 1449. 
 24. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, MONTHLY BUDGET REVIEW (October 6, 2005) 
(concluding that the preliminary Fiscal Year 2005 federal budget deficit was $317 billion). 
 25. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, UNDERSTANDING TAX 
REFORM: A GUIDE TO 21ST CENTURY ALTERNATIVES 6, 29 (2005) (citing the National Taxpayer 
Advocate Service estimates, noting that there are approximately 130 million individual taxpayers). 
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ultimately paid, was between $257 and $298 billion.26 In light of 
concerns about the current budget deficits and declining compliance, 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue Mark Everson has pledged to 
increase tax enforcement and tax compliance.27
B. Factors Affecting Tax Compliance 
1. Reasons for Tax Compliance 
Notwithstanding the popular maxim that “taxes are what we pay for 
a civilized society,”28 most people would rather not give money to the 
government. However, the federal income tax system in the United 
States depends on “voluntary compliance.”29 In fact, our system of 
voluntary compliance does not mean that tax compliance is a matter of 
choice. Rather, the filing of self-reported tax returns and the paying of 
taxes is a “voluntary compulsion.”30 That is, taxpayers are required to 
report their income and tax owed rather than the government undertaking 
the costly job of determining and collecting each taxpayer’s liability.31 
Attempting to determine each taxpayer’s liability without significant 
 26. New IRS Study Provides Preliminary Tax Gap Estimate, supra note 20. 
 27. See, e.g., Closing the Tax Gap and the Impact on Small Businesses Before the H. Comm. 
on Small Business, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Mark W. Everson, Commissioner, Internal 
Revenue Service), available at http://wwwc.house.gov/smbiz/hearings/ 
databaseDrivenHearingsSystem/displayTestimony.asp?hearingIdDateFormat=050427&testimonyId
=306 [hereinafter Everson Testimony]; Nina E. Olson, the National Taxpayer Advocate, has 
expressed support for increased enforcement, but not at the expense of taxpayer services. Allen 
Kenney, Déjà vu? Bush Wants $500 Million for IRS to Toughen Up in 2006, 106 TAX NOTES 747, 
748 (2005). 
 28.  
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector, 275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927)
 29. George W. Dent, Jr., Race, Trust, Altruism and Reciprocity, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1001, 
1012 (2005) (noting the necessity of the tax system to rely on voluntary compliance because of the 
costs of auditing large numbers of returns) (citations omitted); see also Michael G. Allingham & 
Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 323, 334 (1972); 
Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, The Criminal Deterrence Literature: Implications for Research on 
Taxpayer Compliance, in 2 TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE: SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 126, 127 
(Jeffrey A. Roth & John T. Scholz eds., 1989). In fact, the vast majority of all taxpayers pay their 
taxes as required without incident. 
 30. Lederman, Interplay supra note 4, at 1455 n.6 (citing George Guttman, The Interplay of 
Enforcement and Voluntary Compliance, 83 TAX NOTES 1683, 1685 (1999) (quoting former 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue Jerome Kurtz)); see also Jackson, supra note 13, at 318 (noting 
the fact that tax protestor claims that they need not pay taxes is based on a mistaken interpretation of 
the self-reporting nature of the tax system). 
 31. I.R.C. § 6001 (2000).  
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cooperation from those who pay the tax would be prohibitively 
expensive. Although the U.S. tax system is a very successful system of 
voluntary compliance,32 government officials agree that the compliance 
rate is too low and may be declining.33 In recent years, the IRS has 
undertaken several initiatives to increase compliance.34
An understanding of the motivations that lead to tax compliance is 
important to understanding how to improve tax compliance. Economic 
factors, legal consequences, social norms, and personal beliefs all 
influence tax compliance. However, none of the studies of tax 
compliance have been able to determine how to predict the causes of 
compliance in a particular case. 35
From an economic perspective, an individual will likely comply with 
the requirements of the tax laws if the expected cost of tax compliance is 
less than the expected cost of noncompliance.36 The expected cost of 
noncompliance depends on the likelihood of detection, the size of 
penalties available, and the nature of the penalties that may be imposed if 
noncompliance is discovered. Given that the audit rate is currently less 
than one percent37 and penalties for noncompliance, which generally 
range from twenty to seventy-five percent of the amount of the 
 32. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing, 90 
CAL. L. REV. 1513, 1520 (2002); Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action and Law, 81 B.U.L. REV. 
333, 341 (2001). 
 33. See Everson Testimony, supra note 27 (stating that according to data collected by the 
National Research Program, in 2001 compliance was lower than in 1988, the last year for which 
detailed compliance data was available); GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HIGH RISK 
SERIES: AN UPDATE, GAO-05-207, at 37 (2005); Allen Kenney, Year In Review: Everson Evaluates 
State of IRS, Pledges Strong Agenda for 2005, 106 TAX NOTES 40 (2004) (referring to 
Commissioner Everson’s goal to increase collection); Marjorie Kornhauser, Doing the Fully Monty, 
Will Publicizing Tax Information Increase Compliance, 107 TAX NOTES 999, 1002 (2005); Martin 
A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: The Economic Cost of Bashing the IRS, 103 TAX NOTES 791 
(2004); David Cay Johnston, Protestors Win a Case Over IRS, N.Y. TIMES June 24, 2005, at C1. 
 34. Written Testimony of Commissioner of Internal Revenue Mark Everson Before Subcomm. 
on Federal Financial Management, Government Information and International Security, Committee 
on Homeland Security and Government Affairs (October 26, 2005), 2005 TAX NOTES TODAY 207–
24. 
 35. See Joel Slemrod, Why People Pay Taxes: Introduction, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: 
TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, 2 (1992); Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case 
of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781, 1782 (2000). 
 36. See, e.g., Lederman, Interplay, supra note 4, at 1457. 
 37. In 2005, the audit rate for individual returns is about 0.9%, which is a 20% increase over 
2004, and up from 0.49% in 2000. Allen Kenney, High-Income Audits Contribute to Record IRS 
Enforcement Stats, 2005 TAX NOTES TODAY 213. 
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underpayment, are not always imposed, economic analysis does not fully 
explain the high rate of tax compliance in the United States.38
The legal consequences of noncompliance may contribute to 
taxpayers’ decisions to comply. These factors include the likelihood of 
detection, the amount and nature of penalties (e.g., monetary or 
criminal), the likelihood that severe penalties will be imposed, the cost of 
compliance, and third party withholding and reporting.39
Social norms and individual beliefs also influence tax compliance. 
The important factors relating to norms include: age, education, personal 
satisfaction with the government, perceptions that the tax system is fair, 
occupation, opportunity to not comply, taxpayer attitudes and beliefs, 
gender, and marital status.40 In addition, taxpayers who believe that the 
government does not spend money wisely or spends money on programs 
with which the taxpayer disagrees are less likely to comply with their tax 
obligations.41 For instance, individuals who are over the age of sixty-
five, married, or in certain occupations are more likely to comply with 
the tax laws than members of other groups.42
Further, individual perceptions of the tax system strongly affect tax 
compliance. The perceived fairness of the tax system is influenced by the 
 38. See Kornhauser, supra note 33 at 1000; Johnson, supra note 4 at 1013–14; GOVERNMENT 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HIGH RISK SERIES: AN UPDATE, GAO-05-207, at 37 (2005); Sullivan, 
supra note 33; Kenney, supra note 33 (referring to Commissioner Everson’s goal to increase 
collection). 
 39. See generally Lederman, Interplay, supra note 4; Long & Swingen, supra note 19, at 
666; Slemrod, supra note 35; Loretta J. Stalans, Kent W. Smith & Karyl A. Kinsey, When do We 
Think About Detection? Structural Opportunity and Taxpaying Behavior, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
481 (1989) (considering the data gathered by the 1985 and 1988 Minnesota state department of 
revenue studies); Robert Kidder and Craig McEwen, Taxpayer Behavior in Social Context: A 
Tentative Typology of Tax Compliance and Noncompliance, in 2 TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE: SOCIAL 
SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 47 (Jeffrey A. Roth & John T. Scholz eds) (1989); JAMES ALM, ET AL., THE 
EFFECTS OF COMMUNICATION AMONG TAXPAYERS ON COMPLIANCE, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/04alm.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2005). 
 40. See, e.g., Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein, supra note 4, at 840. 
 41. See, e.g., Steve R. Johnson, The Dangers of Symbolic Legislation: Perceptions and 
Realities of the New Burden-of-Proof Rules, 84 IOWA L. REV. 413; Robert Mason & Lyle D. Calvin, 
Public Confidence and Admitted Tax Evasion, 37 NAT’L TAX J. 489, 489 (1984). 
 42. See, e.g., Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein, supra note 4, at 840 (“Business filers in finance, 
real estate, and insurance; agriculture, forestry, and fishing; and wholesale trade industries 
understated taxes by the lowest percentages . . . .”); Jackson, supra note 13, at 295 (describing 
converts to the protestor movement as generally being “conservative, middle-aged, white, Christian 
males who possess an above average education, an above average salary, a past history of tax 
compliance, and a growing dissatisfaction with government policies” (footnote omitted)); Chester N. 
Mitchell, Willingness-To-Pay: Taxation and Tax Compliance, 15 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 127, 129 
(1985). 
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interaction of the government with taxpayers. This also may be 
influenced by the government and the IRS’s treatment of tax protestors. 
Because tax protestors vocally oppose what they believe to be unfair 
treatment, they may influence perceptions on a large-scale basis. 
Moreover, because taxpayer confidentiality is required by law, in many 
cases the IRS will not have the means to effectively refute allegations of 
unfair treatment. Taxpayer perceptions are also closely related to and 
may be affected by other influences on tax compliance, which include 
audit rates, publicity about successful tax avoidance schemes, penalties, 
and social norms. 
Audits affect taxpayers directly and indirectly. The audit directly 
affects the taxpayer by determining the taxpayer’s correct tax liability. 
Indirectly, the audit increases future compliance by both the taxpayer and 
others who learn of the audit and its results. An audit may cause an 
increase of self-reported income by many times the amount of the 
adjustment proposed during the audit.43 However, because audits are 
costly to both the government and the taxpayer, only a small percentage 
of returns are audited.44 The low audit rate increases the odds of winning 
the “audit lottery” and, to the extent the rate is generally known, may 
decrease a taxpayer’s willingness to fully report his or her income. 
Moreover, it is unlikely that the government will allocate significant 
additional funding to tax enforcement, including increased audit or 
collection efforts.45
 43. See Johnson, supra note 4, at 1027 (stating that the audit may increase collection by up to 
eleven times the amount of the adjustment); Brown & Mazur, supra note 19, at 1259; INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERVICE, THE DETERMINANTS OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE, ESTIMATING 
THE IMPACTS OF TAX POLICY, ENFORCEMENT, AND IRS RESPONSIBENESS (2003) [hereinafter 
DETERMINANTS OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE]; INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE, 
ESTIMATING THE IMPACTS OF TAX POLICY, ENFORCEMENT, AND IRS RESPONSIVENESS 1 (1996); 
Reducing the Tax Gap: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Federal Fin. Mgmt., Gov’t Info., & Int’l 
Sec. of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, 109th Cong. 11 (statement of Nina E. 
Olson, National Taxpayer Advocate (audit adjustment may increase tax collection by six to twelve 
times the proposed adjustment)); see also AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTANTS, supra note 26, at 29 (citing Jeffery A. Dubin, Michael J. Graetz  & Lois L. Wilde, 
The Effects of Audit Rates on the Federal Individual Income Tax, 43 NAT’L TAX J. 395 (1990)). In 
addition, although the IRS has estimated that for every additional dollar allocated to tax enforcement 
it will collect over four dollars of tax due, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration has 
questioned that estimate. TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, A BETTER 
MODEL IS NEEDED TO PROJECT THE RETURN ON ADDITIONAL INVESTMENTS IN TAX ENFORCEMENT, 
TIGTA Ref. No. 2005-10-159 (2005), available at http://www.treas.gov/tiga/auditreports/ 
2205reports/200510159fr.html. 
 44. DETERMINANTS OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE, supra note 43, at 1. 
 45. Johnson, supra note 4, at 1013–14. 
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Studies show that people who believe the IRS will detect tax evasion 
or underreporting are more likely to correctly report their income.46 The 
audit rate and the apparent risk of audit influence the perceived risk of 
detection.47 Risk of audit may be influenced by the positions, credits, 
and deductions that a taxpayer reports. However, the factors used to 
select a specific return for audit are generally unknown. In addition, 
empirical research suggests that individual members of the general 
population are more likely to overestimate rather than underestimate 
their risk of audit.48 Although taxpayers tend to overestimate their risk of 
audit, publicity about very low audit rates may cause an individual 
taxpayer to maintain a false belief that she is unlikely to be audited. 
In addition, compliance is influenced by the likely consequences of 
detection,49 which include civil penalties, criminal sanctions,50 and 
social stigma.51 The magnitude of sanctions that are likely to be imposed 
also influence the effect on tax compliance. A small chance of a large 
penalty, a large chance of a small penalty, or a large chance of a large 
penalty may have different consequences for expected tax compliance. 
Notwithstanding the availability of sanctions, in some cases there 
will be little or no negative consequence from the tax avoidance, or the 
imposition of the penalty may be delayed, even in well-known cases of 
tax avoidance. For instance, despite a front-page story in the New York 
Times in 2000 that Al Thompson, the owner of Cencal Aviation 
Products, had decided not to withhold taxes from his employees because 
he believed that he was not legally obligated to do so, the IRS did not 
take any public action against Mr. Thompson until 2003.52 During this 
period, Mr. Thompson showed many others the means by which he 
avoided taxes.53 Although Mr. Thompson was ultimately convicted of 
 46. Kornhauser, supra note 33, at 1000; Lederman, Interplay, supra note 4, at 1464–65. 
 47. ALAN H. PLUMLEY, IRS NAT’L HEADQUARTERS OFFICE OF RESEARCH, THE IMPACT OF 
THE IRS ON VOLUNTARY TAX COMPLIANCE: PRELIMINARY EMPIRICAL RESULTS (Nov. 14–16, 
2002) http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/irsvct/pdf. 
 48. Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein, supra note 4, at 844. 
 49. See, e.g., Richard C. Stark, A Principled Approach to Collection and Accuracy-Related 
Penalties, 91 TAX NOTES 115, 117 (2001). In studies conducted on individuals, people were more 
likely to overestimate the likely cost of penalties if presented with data on likelihood of audit and 
likely range of penalty separately. 
 50. See infra Part V. 
 51. See, e.g., Stark, supra note 49. 
 52. David Cay Johnston, Tax Cheat Sentenced to 6 Years for Defying I.R.S., N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 14, 2005, at C3. Thompson was not convicted and sentenced until 2005. Id. 
 53. Id. 
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criminal conduct, his very visible and apparently successful tax 
avoidance over a period of years could cause the public to underestimate 
the likely consequences of tax avoidance. To some degree the steps taken 
to collect taxes from vocal tax protestors may go unnoticed because of 
the requirement that the IRS keep taxpayer information confidential.54 
Highly publicized examples like Al Thompson may contribute to an 
impression that even though the IRS may impose criminal and civil 
penalties for tax noncompliance, penalties are unlikely to outweigh the 
benefit of noncompliance. 
Perhaps fortunately, fines or imprisonment are not the sole sanction 
that may result from tax noncompliance. Even if a taxpayer believes that 
a penalty is unlikely to be imposed, the taxpayer may comply because 
she anticipates that social stigma or feelings of guilt will be associated 
with noncompliance.55 Thus, social stigma associated with tax evasion 
may increase compliance even if the economic benefit of tax 
noncompliance will outweigh monetary penalties or criminal sanctions 
associated with noncompliance. Similarly, the degree to which a 
taxpayer believes he would feel guilt about cheating on his taxes may 
influence compliance decisions.56 Social stigma and feelings of guilt 
may flow from a taxpayer’s belief in the legitimacy of the tax system and 
its fairness. While very important to tax compliance, social stigma and 
feelings of guilt are less easily quantified than monetary penalties. 
In addition, taxpayers who believe that they are legally required to 
pay taxes are more likely to comply with their tax obligations.57 
However, taxpayers, especially those who are dissatisfied with the 
government or its policies, may be swayed by persuasive arguments 
against the tax system. Nonetheless, the idea that the payment of taxes is 
optional is an example of the adage that an idea that sounds too good to 
be true probably is. 
 54. David Cay Johnson, U.S. Warning to Business on Tax Protest, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2001, 
at C1 (noting that although tax liens were filed, the liens were not discovered because the IRS used a 
variation of the company’s name). 
 55. However, social stigma associated with noncompliance is likely to be minimized by the 
fact that a taxpayer who is not accused of a criminal tax violation may avoid any public disclosure of 
his or her tax noncompliance by settling the matter with the IRS without resort to court action. See 
I.R.C. § 6103 (2000). 
 56. Stalans, Smith & Kinsey, supra note 39, at 499. 
 57. Posner, supra note 35; DETERMINANTS OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE, supra 
note 43 (1996). There is data available that suggests that overall taxpayers believe that it is wrong to 
cheat on their taxes. IRS OVERSIGHT BOARD, 2004 TAXPAYER ATTITUDE SURVEY (reporting that 
86% of the respondents in 2004, 81% in 2003, 86% in 2002, and 87% in 1999 indicated that no 
amount of cheating on one’s income taxes was acceptable).  
2CORDS.FIN.DOC 3/14/2006 5:16:09 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2005 
1528 
 
Finally, the taxpayer’s belief regarding whether others do or do not 
pay taxes can influence the taxpayer’s views on the necessity of tax 
compliance.58 Information on others’ tax compliance often comes from 
media reports. Media reports on the increasing tax gap, successful tax 
protestors, and tax avoidance schemes may create or increase the 
perception that others successfully avoid paying taxes.59 This perception 
may cause otherwise honest taxpayers to be less likely to report and pay 
their taxes because no one wants to be a “chump.”60 This, in turn, may 
cause a cascading effect.61 The stronger the perception that others do not 
pay taxes, the more likely an individual is to believe that he should not 
pay taxes, which may make that individual more willing to cheat on his 
taxes.62
2. Reasons for noncompliance 
Another element of taxpayer perception relates to whether the tax 
system is viewed as being fair. An individual’s perceptions that the tax 
system is unfair or treats similarly situated taxpayers differently may 
reduce compliance. Visible noncompliance by tax protestors may reduce 
general perceptions of tax fairness because the refusal to share in the cost 
of public goods means that the tax protestors’ share of those costs must 
be borne by other members of society. To the extent that such refusal to 
pay and inaction by the government are known or publicized, general tax 
compliance may decline because the majority may be unwilling to 
support free-riding by tax protestors.63
 58. Kornhauser, supra note 33, at 1000; Lederman, Interplay, supra note 7, at 1470. 
 59. Stark, supra note 49, at 117. The reverse is also true. Reports of increased enforcement 
activity or audit rate may increase compliance. See, e.g., Lederman, Interplay, supra note 4, at 1486–
87. 
 60. Stark, supra note 49, at 118; Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective 
Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71, 87 (2003); Lederman, Interplay, supra note 4, at 1487. 
 61. See, e.g., Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein, supra note 4, at 851. 
 62. This is borne out in commentary suggesting that the perception that it is okay to cheat on 
taxes has been rising. See Curtis J. Berger, “Voluntary” Self-Assessment? The Unwilling Extraction 
of Taxpayer Information, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 759, 759 & n.3 (1981); Johnson, supra note 4, at 1021. 
See generally Dan M. Kahan, Signaling or Reciprocating? A Response to Eric Posner’s Law and 
Social Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 367, 378–80 (2002) (discussing how perceptions of cheating on 
taxes affects compliance); Mitchell, supra note 42, at 131 (1985) (discussing how undetected tax 
evasion encourages others to not comply). 
 63. See, e.g., NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERVICE, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT TO 
CONGRESS 217; Jon S. Davis, Gary Hecht & Jon D. Perkins, Social Behavior, Enforcement and Tax 
Compliance Dynamics, 78 THE ACCT. REV. 39 (2003); Kahan, supra note 60, at 84 (“Auditing 
crackdowns and other high-profile modes of enforcement risk backfiring, the evidence suggests, 
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Notwithstanding the concern that tax protestors’ failure to pay their 
share of taxes may harm the compliance rate, failure to provide an 
effective, accessible means to redress disagreements about the 
application of the tax laws can also make the tax system appear to be less 
fair, and therefore, less legitimate. To promote the perception that the tax 
system fairly addresses questions regarding individual liabilities, legal 
challenges to tax determinations must be permitted. However, not all 
challenges to individual tax liabilities or criticisms of the tax system are 
legitimate. Nonetheless, it is essential to remember that even a tax 
protestor can raise a legitimate claim that the law was misapplied in a 
particular instance. Without looking to the merits of each case, it is 
virtually impossible to determine with certainty that none of the claims 
raised have any legitimacy. Summary rejection of suits or claims that 
include typical tax protestor rhetoric, without at least some consideration 
of the merits, can create the impression that access to justice is being 
unfairly denied to some. 
Thus, even though in most cases the resources used to process and 
decide tax protestors’ claims could be devoted to more visibly productive 
activities, their claims must be given some consideration to avoid 
creating the perception that the tax system is unfair. Moreover, while 
disregarding any group of taxpayers may undermine the perception of the 
fairness of the tax system, tax protestors tend to be a vocal group and 
may produce more publicity about their inability to challenge the laws. 
This Article proposes, as explained in Part V, that tax protestors must be 
permitted to express their views and must have access to the 
administrative and judicial system, but such access must not be without 
cost when it is used only to avoid or delay payment of a legitimate tax 
liability. 
Additionally, taxpayer confidentiality provides a challenge to 
influencing taxpayer perceptions. The law prohibits the IRS and its 
employees from disclosing individual taxpayer information.64 This 
prohibition hinders efforts to increase tax compliance by triggering social 
stigma. Even when the IRS imposes penalties on a tax protestor, unless a 
public record is created by the filing of a lien or a court case, information 
about the identity of the taxpayer and penalties imposed is likely to be 
protected against disclosure. Thus, tax protestors and tax scheme 
because they function as a cue that evasion is widespread. . . . [Officials] should take advantage of 
the attention that high-profile prosecutions naturally attract to publicize positive information . . . .”); 
Lederman, Interplay, supra note 4. 
 64. I.R.C. § 6103 (2000). 
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promoters have an advantage: they may very vocally and publicly claim 
that the tax system is illegitimate and that they do not suffer 
consequences for failing to pay taxes. Yet the Service cannot reveal what 
it is doing with respect to individual tax protestors, or even whether 
specific allegations are true. As a result, only nonspecific information 
can be released. Thus, the incidence of detection of a particular evasion 
technique and the magnitude of the penalty likely to be imposed may not 
be well known. IRS Notices regarding transactions may increase public 
awareness of government enforcement efforts, but such notices may not 
be widely read outside the tax profession. Further, such notices may not 
provide sufficiently concrete information to alert taxpayers as to the 
likelihood that a particular approach to tax avoidance will be detected or 
the likely consequences of detection. Moreover, such notices cannot refer 
to individual taxpayers by name. 
In addition, elected officials, politicians, and commentators 
frequently challenge the fairness of the tax system. Because public 
support of the tax system is essential to tax compliance, challenges to the 
tax system made by politicians and officials may reduce tax compliance. 
Recent examples of widely publicized challenges to the fairness of the 
system of tax administration include the widely publicized hearings 
conducted by the Senate Finance Committee in 1997 and 199865 and 
political campaigns calling for the abolition of income tax or institution 
of a “fairer” tax as a campaign platform issue.66 Likewise, in recent 
years, bills have been introduced in both houses of Congress calling for 
the elimination of the Tax Code.67
 65. IRS Oversight: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 105th Cong. (1998) (hearings 
conducted on Apr. 28, 29. 30 and May 1, 1998); IRS Restructuring: Hearings Before the S. Comm. 
on Finance, 105th Cong. (1998) (hearings conducted on January 28. 29, and February 5, 11, and 25, 
1998); Practices and Procedures of the Internal Revenue Service: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on 
Finance, 105th Cong. (1997) (hearings conducted on September 23, 24, and 25, 1997).  
 66. Steve Forbes challenged the current income tax system and the need for the IRS during 
his presidential campaign. See, e.g., Eric Schmitt, In New Hampshire, Forbes Works to Win the 
Skeptics, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1999, at A27. Steve Forbes recently wrote a book, again advocating a 
flat tax and a postcard return as a means to eliminate the IRS. STEVE FORBES, FLAT TAX 
REVOLUTION: USING A POSTCARD TO ABOLISH THE IRS (2005). 
 67. See S. 1921, 109th Cong. (2005) (stating that the purpose of the Act was “[t]o promote 
freedom, fairness, and economic opportunity by repealing the income tax and other taxes, abolishing 
the Internal Revenue Service, and replacing such taxes with a national sales tax and a business tax”); 
Date Certain Tax Code Replacement Act, H.R. 278, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003) (“The purpose of this 
Act is to set a date certain for replacing the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 with a simple and fair 
alternative.”); Date Certain Tax Code Replacement Act, H.R. 4716, 107th Cong. (2002); Date 
Certain Tax Code Replacement Act, H.R. 4199, 107th Cong. (2001); Date Certain Tax Code 
Replacement Act, H.R. 4199, 106th Cong. (2000) (passing in the House and dying in the Senate); 
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Much of the testimony during the 1997 and 1998 Senate hearings 
questioned the integrity of the tax collection system. The hearings led to 
the enactment of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform 
Act of 1998 (RRA 1998)68 At these hearings, testimony was taken from 
priests, single mothers, business owners, and current and former IRS 
employees, many of whom testified behind a screen to protect their 
identity.69 These hearings, investigating IRS activities, were televised, 
widely discussed in the media,70 and conducted in a “circus-like 
atmosphere.”71 Much of the testimony was later determined to be 
erroneous.72 However, despite the publicity of the hearings leading to an 
outcry against the IRS, the subsequent discovery of inaccuracies was not 
as widely discussed.73 Such public challenges to the tax system, its 
collection mechanisms, and the attention drawn to governmental 
ineffectiveness at preventing tax avoidance may lead more individuals 
and groups to question the fairness and validity of the tax system.74
Increasing confidence in the fairness of the tax system may be 
difficult.75 The United States has a long history of tax revolts and tax 
protests, which include the Boston Tea Party, the Whiskey Rebellion, 
Shays’ Rebellion, the Second Whiskey Rebellion, and protests leading 
Tax Code Termination Act of 1998, H.R. 3097, 105th Cong. (1998) (passing in the House with a 
vote of 219 to 209, but dying in the Senate). The impetus for bills to repeal the income tax, to 
eliminate the IRS, or to repeal the current tax code stem largely from frustration with the complexity 
of the current law and a desire for reform. However, when viewed in isolation and from the 
perspective of individuals looking for a way to justify their own noncompliance, these proposals 
may provide the desired excuse for rejecting the tax system as unfair, abusive, or illegitimate. See 
Kornhauser, Legitimacy, supra note 13, at 891–92 (discussing the images associated with and effects 
of such proposals). 
 68. Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998) (codified as amended in various sections of the 
I.R.C.). 
 69. Practices and Procedures of the Internal Revenue Service: Hearings Before the S. Comm. 
on Finance, 105th Cong. (1997). 
 70. Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial Paradigm 
Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1, 81 (2004). 
 71. Joe Spellman, Conference Panel Ponders Finance Hearing Horror Stories, 83 TAX 
NOTES 1854, 1855 (1999) (quoting Cono R. Namorato of Caplin & Drysdale in Washington, D.C.). 
 72. See, e.g., Leslie Book, CDP and Collection: Perceptions and Misperceptions, 107 TAX 
NOTES 487, 487 (2005); Camp, supra note 70, at 81; Danshera Cords, How Much Process Is Due? 
I.R.C. Sections 6320 and 6330 Collection Due Process Hearings, 29 VT. L. REV. 51, 52 (2004). 
 73. See, e.g., NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERVICE, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT TO 
CONGRESS 457; Bryan T. Camp, Replacing CDP, 107 TAX NOTES 1039, 1039 (2005). 
 74. Kornhauser, Legitimacy, supra note 13, at 906. 
 75. See, e.g., CHARLES ADAMS, THOSE DIRTY ROTTEN TAXES: THE TAX REVOLTS THAT 
BUILT AMERICA (1998) (explaining that America was built on a commitment to freedom from 
taxation). 
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up to the Civil War.76 These incidents illustrate the historical importance 
of tax protests in the United States, which some view as a component of 
efforts to throw off the harness of government oppression. The freedom 
and willingness to express concerns about the government and its actions 
are important to a free society; however, there are important differences 
between questioning the government and refusing to obey the law. 
Because high tax compliance rates are essential to the effective 
operation of the U.S. government, and because it is unlikely that 
significant additional resources will be devoted to tax enforcement, the 
government must maintain or even increase tax compliance through 
other means. Enhancing the general perception that the tax system is fair 
could encourage and possibly even increase tax compliance. The effect 
might be further enhanced by publicizing the magnitude of penalties 
imposed in cases where noncompliance is detected. 
III. PROTESTOR RHETORIC 
Although tax protestors are like others tax avoiders and evaders in 
many respects, they differ from the norm in that they use a variety of 
arguments to justify their refusal to pay any taxes. The belief that there is 
legal justification for tax noncompliance distinguishes tax protestors 
from other noncompliant taxpayers who either have made errors in 
preparing their tax returns or have purposely violated the law. 
This Section will analyze tax protestor arguments by discussing the 
individuals and groups that embrace these arguments, and then providing 
an overview of some of the most common constitutional and statutory 
challenges they raise against the income tax. 
A. Tax Protestors and Promoters of Tax Protest Approaches 
Tax protestors come from all walks of life. Tax protestors are not just 
lay individuals; they are often well educated. Among the prominent tax 
protestors are accountants,77 business owners,78 former IRS 
 76. See, e.g., id.; Kornhauser, supra note 33. 
 77. See, e.g., Rotzinger v. United States, 165 F.3d 33 (7th Cir. 1998) (tax accountant 
counseled clients not to report income); Stoecklin v. Comm’r 865 F.2d 1221 (11th Cir. 1989) 
(taxpayer had been a certified public accountant for many years). 
 78. See, e.g., United States v. Codner, 210 F.3d 390, (10th Cir. 2000); David Cay Johnston, 
Mistrial Declared in Tax Withholding Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2003, at C4 (discussing the case 
of Richard M. Simkanin, owner of Arrow Custom Plastics, who stopped withholding taxes from his 
employees in 2000); David Cay Johnston, Tax Protestor Is Convicted on 13 U.S. Charges, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 29, 2005, at C11 (explaining that Al Thomson, owner of Cencal Aviation Products, was 
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employees,79 chiropractors,80 sheriff’s deputies,81 and airline pilots.82 
On many occasions, protestor positions have been used by attorneys on 
their own behalf and on behalf of their clients.83
Tax protestors use books, live seminars, and the Internet to share and 
promote their justifications for the nonpayment of taxes.84 In addition, 
the sale of tax protestor schemes can be profitable. Some tax protestors, 
including organizations85 and individuals, sell their ideas to others. For 
instance, Thurston Paul Bell made $60,000 between 2000 and 2002 by 
selling packages that explain his tax protestor theory on his websites, 
www.nite.org and www.taxgate.com.86 Similarly, Irwin Schiff has 
written several books and sells his tax avoidance schemes on his website 
convicted of tax evasion and other charges for failing to withhold and pay employment taxes on his 
employees). 
 79. See, e.g., Laughlin v. Comm’r, 117 F. Supp 2d 997 (S.D. Cal. 2000) (discussing the 
report that Joseph Banister made to the IRS concerning his belief that the government could not 
require the payment of taxes and that IRS procedures were unconstitutional; after making the report, 
he resigned his position as an IRS Criminal Investigation Division agent). 
 80. See, e.g., United States v. Sather, 3 Fed. App’x. 725 (10th Cir. 2001) (chiropractor used 
trusts to divert income based on belief that he was not subject to tax); David Cay Johnston, Hearing 
Ordered on Claim that IRS Influenced Jury, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2004, at C4 (discussing case of 
Dr. Martin P. Rutherford). 
 81. See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, Tax Cheat Sentenced to 6 Years for Defying I.R.S., N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 14, 2005, at C3 (referring to Matthew J. Allen, a Marin County, California deputy 
sheriff and follower of former IRS CID agent Joseph Banister). 
 82. See, e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991); United States v. Engh, 330 F.3d 
951 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 83. See, e.g., Roberts v. Comm’r, 329 F.3d 1224, 1229 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that although 
the attorney was representing himself in this case, he had lost on the same issue in a previous suit 
where he represented another taxpayer); United States v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619, 623 (10th Cir. 
1990); Charczuk v. Comm’r, 771 F.2d 471 (10th Cir. 1985); Ficarola v. Comm’r, 751 F.2d 85, (2d 
Cir. 1984); Takaba v. Comm’r, 119 T.C. 285 (2002) (imposing penalties on both the attorney and the 
taxpayer); Lunsford v. Comm’r, 117 T.C. 183, 187 (2001) (noting Thomas W. Roberts, the attorney 
who had filed the petition, had raised such frivolous arguments before and had been disbarred from 
practice before the court); Davis v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 35 (2000); Francis X. Sullivan, Comment, The 
“Usurping Octopus of Jurisdictional/Authority”: The Legal Theories of the Sovereign Citizen 
Movement, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 785, 790 (citing Charczuk, 771 F.2d at 476). 
 84. See supra note 8. 
 85. Members of “We the People” have recently been successfully prosecuted for promoting 
bogus tax schemes that promised to limit income tax liability. Press Release, U.S. Attorney, Cent. 
Dist. of Cal., Several Tax Fraud Promoters Sentenced to Prison for Falsely Promising to Protect 
Income From Taxes (June 7, 2005), http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/cac/ 
pr2005/086.html. Another organization that has promoted tax protestor schemes is Morningstar 
Consultants. United States v. Raymond, 228 F.3d 804, 811–12 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 86. United States v. Bell, 414 F.3d 474, 475 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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www.paynoincometax.com.87 Schiff also owns a bookstore in Las Vegas 
that sells his books and materials.88
Publicity about efforts to stop tax protestors may make their 
positions appear successful and legitimate, which might undermine other 
taxpayers’ beliefs that everyone pays their fair share of taxes. In addition, 
media attention may also make it easier for tax protestors to promote 
their positions and convince others that their nonpayment is legitimate. 
The Department of Justice has successfully undertaken criminal 
prosecutions of many tax protest promoters89 and has obtained 
injunctions against the promotion of tax avoidance schemes.90 These 
efforts have not significantly slowed the growth of the tax protestor 
movement. Promoters often challenge efforts to restrain the promotion of 
their approaches to tax avoidance by challenging the issuance of 
injunctions against selling tax avoidance schemes on First Amendment 
grounds,91 asserting that the scheme being promoted contains protected 
political speech, that the injunction constitutes an unconstitutional prior 
restraint on speech, or both.92 However, the courts reject these 
contentions because courts can draw an injunction narrowly enough to 
 87. See United States v. Schiff, 379 F.3d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 2004). The Department of Justice 
has obtained an injunction preventing him from selling his most recent book. In addition, much to 
the chagrin of his followers, in response to a civil suit brought by the Justice Department for $2.5 
million in taxes, interest, and penalties, Mr. Schiff put forth the defense that he suffers from 
delusions. Stanley Bing, Nuts to You!, FORTUNE, Mar. 8, 2004, at 218; David Cay Johnston, Tax 
Protestor Tells Federal Court That He Is Delusional, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2004, at C3 (noting that 
Mr. Schiff, through his girlfriend and partner in promoting tax protestor materials, sent an email to 
supporters alleging the claim of delusions was a ruse). 
 88. Schiff, 379 F.3d at 623. 
 89. Irwin Schiff has multiple convictions for avoidance and promotion of tax avoidance 
schemes. See United States v. Schiff, 801 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1986) (affirming a conviction for 
attempted tax evasion and willful failure to file a corporate tax return); United States v. Schiff, 612 
F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1979) (reversing conviction for willful failure to file an income tax return and 
remanding to lower court on evidentiary issue). George H. Jesson was another tax protestor who 
promoted tax avoidance and was later indicted and plead guilty to felony tax avoidance.  Mr. Jesson 
bragged in interviews about the things he was able to afford because he did not pay taxes. David Cay 
Johnston, Tax Protestor Pleads Guilty to Filing False Claim, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2005, at C2. He 
and other businessmen who were featured as examples of the legality of avoidance by We the People 
Foundation are serving prison terms. Id. 
 90. See, e.g., Schiff, 379 F.3d at 621; see also David Cay Johnston, Court Says Author Can’t 
Sell His Book on Evading Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2004, at C5; Court Blocks Antitax Book, 35 
AM. LIBR., Oct. 2004 at   20. 
 91. See, e.g., United States v. Bell, 414 F.3d 474, 481–85 (3d Cir. 2005); Schiff, 379 F.3d at 
621; United States v. Raymond, 228 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 92. Bell, 414 F.3d at 478, 481 (arguing that an injunction was both an unconstitutional prior 
restraint on speech a violation of the right to free political speech); Schiff, 379 F.3d at 626 (arguing 
that an injunction was an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech). 
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prevent prior restraint or restriction of political speech. Furthermore, 
courts have held that false commercial speech and statements designed to 
aid and abet a violation of the tax law are not protected speech.93
The protestors’ frivolous arguments take a variety of forms, which 
are often summarily dismissed by the courts.94 Many courts have 
reasoned that more than summary dismissal might encourage other 
people to use the protestor rhetoric to delay collection of their tax 
liability.95 For instance, after having considered the frivolous positions 
in a number of cases, the Tax Court stated that the “time has arrived 
when the Court should deal summarily and decisively with such cases 
without engaging in scholarly discussion of the issues or attempting to 
soothe the feelings of the petitioners by referring to the supposed 
‘sincerity’ of their wildly espoused positions.”96 Part B will discuss 
some of the specific contentions that promoters and tax protestors have 
advanced in furtherance of their efforts to avoid paying taxes. 
 93. Bell, 414 F.3d at 480–83. 
 94. See, e.g., Crain v. Comm’r, 737 F.2d 1417, 1417 (5th Cir. 1984) (“We perceive no need 
to refute these arguments with somber reasoning and copious citation of precedent; to do so might 
suggest that these arguments have some colorable merit.”); McCoy v. Comm’r, 76 T.C. 1027, 1029–
30, aff’d 696 F.2d 1234 (9th Cir. 1981) (“The time has arrived when the Court should deal 
summarily and decisively with such cases without engaging in scholarly discussion of the issues or 
attempting to soothe the feelings of the petitioners by referring to the supposed ‘sincerity’ of their 
wildly espoused positions”); Ketler v. Comm’r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1495 (1999) (following McCoy v. 
Comm’r, 76 T.C. 1027, 1029–30 (1981)). 
 95. See, e.g., Stallard v. Comm’r, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 993 (1992) (“[Taxpayer’s] arguments are 
no more than stale tax protester contentions long dismissed summarily by this Court and all other 
courts which have heard such contentions.”); Jackson v. Comm’r, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 920 (1991) 
(concluding after taxpayer filed both a petition and amended petition that raised only tax protestor 
arguments that “no useful purpose would be served by affording the parties a further hearing in this 
matter”); Havrilla v. Comm’r, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 919 (1991) (“We see no reason to again refute these 
arguments with somber reasoning and copious citation of precedent.”); Derksen v. Comm’r, 84 T.C. 
355 (1985) (granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted 
in either the petition or the amended petition). In other cases, the court has noted that had the Service 
filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, that dismissal likely would have been granted. 
See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Comm’r, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 1225 (1984); Phillips v. Comm’r, 47 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1223 (1984); Urban v. Comm’r, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 1130 (1984). These same claims have also 
been raised in less traditional fora, such as the bankruptcy court, and summarily dismissed. See, e.g., 
Robnett v. United States, 165 B.R. 272, 274 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994) (affirming the bankruptcy court’s 
dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and imposing a $1,500 
sanction on the debtor for raising only frivolous issues on appeal). 
 96. McCoy v. Comm’r, 76 T.C. 1027, 1029–30, aff’d, 696 F.2d 1234 (9th Cir. 1983). 
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B. Specific Tax Protestor Positions 
1. Constitutional challenges 
Tax protestors use a wide variety of arguments to support their 
claims that they have no tax obligation or that the tax system is 
illegitimate. Many of the contentions raised by tax protestors relate to the 
constitutionality of the income tax. Constitutional challenges include 
arguments that the income tax reporting rules violate the Fifth 
Amendment right against self incrimination, that the collection of taxes 
is a taking without due process of law, that the creation of tax obligations 
violates the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on slavery, and that the 
Sixteenth Amendment was not properly ratified.97 Like other tax 
protestor contentions, the courts have repeatedly rejected these and other 
constitutional challenges to the income tax.98
This Article does not reconsider tax protestor arguments in depth and 
does not attempt to identify all of the types of tax protestor rhetoric 
currently used.99 However, this Article briefly describes a few of the 
more common tax protestor arguments to provide a context for the 
problems created by tax protestors. 
One of the most enduring tax protestor contentions is the claim that 
the Sixteenth Amendment was not properly ratified. The ratification of 
the Sixteenth Amendment is challenged on several grounds.100 The 
challenges to the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment are popular not 
only among the tax protestors,101 but also among the promoters of tax 
protest schemes.102 One claim argues that the ratification of the 
 97. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., THE TRUTH ABOUT FRIVOLOUS TAX ARGUMENTS 
(2005), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/friv_tax.pdf [hereinafter THE TRUTH]. 
 98. Id. 
 99. The Service published a fifty-six-page document, The Truth about Frivolous Tax 
Arguments, in which the Service discusses a number of such arguments, explains why the arguments 
are invalid, and identifies cases rejecting each position. Id. This document also identifies a number 
of bogus claims for credits or deductions, one of which is the “slavery reparation” credit or refund, 
which does not exist. Id. 
 100. The variations include claims that Ohio was not properly admitted as a state and therefore 
President Taft was not president, meaning that he could not convene Congress, and the Secretary of 
State whom the president appointed could not properly certify the ratification of the amendment. See 
Knoblauch v. Comm’r, 749 F.2d 200, 201 (5th Cir. 1984); Jackson, supra note 13, at 301. 
 101. Jackson, supra note 13, at 301–07. 
 102. Miller v. United States, 868 F.2d 236, 240 (7th Cir. 1989) (expressing concern about the 
number of taxpayers raising similar arguments, all based on a book, BILL BENSON & M.J. “RED” 
BECKMAN, THE LAW THAT NEVER WAS (1986)). 
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Sixteenth Amendment was invalid because the Amendment’s language 
was slightly different during some of the states’ ratification vote.103 This 
claim relies on a memorandum written by then Secretary of State Knox 
outlining the differences, primarily spelling and grammatical errors.104 
The Solicitor of the Department of State concluded that the differences 
between versions were immaterial.105
Another argument against the Sixteenth Amendment’s ratification 
posits that Ohio did not become a state until 1953; thus, Ohio was not a 
state at the time of ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, and 
President Taft was not properly President and could not convene 
Congress.106 This contention improperly uses Public Law 204, which 
Congress passed in 1953 to settle a dispute as to the precise date in 1803 
that Ohio became a state.107 This argument is clearly erroneous because 
the 1953 resolution did nothing more than confirm that Ohio became a 
state in 1803.108
Another common constitutional argument against the income tax is 
that it violates the Fifth Amendment.109 These challenges come in two 
forms. The first variant argues that the income tax constitutes a taking by 
government without due process of law.110 However, because the 
government cannot operate without revenue, it must collect taxes. 
Moreover, because the means of collecting taxes must be efficient, the 
courts have repeatedly allowed summary tax collection proceedings 
where they were followed by an opportunity for judicial review.111 The 
second common contention relating to the Fifth Amendment is that 
mandatory income reporting is a violation of a taxpayer’s right against 
 103. See, e.g., THE TRUTH, supra note 97, at 24–26. 
 104. See, e.g., Miller, 868 F.2d at 240–41 (noting that these arguments are frivolous); Jackson, 
supra note 13, at 301–07; BENSON & BECKMAN, supra note 102. 
 105. See, e.g., Miller, 868 F.2d at 240–41 (noting that these arguments are frivolous); Jackson, 
supra note 13, at 301–03. 
 106. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 13, at 305; Johnson v. Comm’r, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 22 
(1979); Baker v. Comm’r, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 307 (1978). 
 107. Jackson, supra note 13, at 305. 
 108. See, e.g., Bowman v. United States, 920 F.Supp. 623, 624 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1995). 
 109. See, e.g., THE TRUTH, supra note 97, at 21–23. 
 110. See, e.g., Schiff v. United States, 919 F.2d 830, 832 (2d Cir. 1990); THE TRUTH supra 
note 97, at 20–21; Jackson, supra note 13, at 307–08; Michael D. Riley, Comment, The Fifth 
Amendment and Tax Protestors: Development and Present Status, 31 LOY. L. REV. 357 (1985). 
 111. Phillips v. Comm’r, 283 U.S. 589, 595 (1931) (“Where, as here, adequate opportunity is 
afforded for a later judicial determination of the legal rights, summary proceedings to secure prompt 
performance of pecuniary obligations to the government have been consistently sustained.”); 
Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1916); see also THE TRUTH, supra note 97, at 2. 
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self-incrimination.112 However, the filing of a tax return is not, by itself, 
an incriminating act.113 Although in a particular instance, a taxpayer 
might successfully challenge the requirement that she make a specific 
disclosure on her tax return because that disclosure in and of itself would 
be incriminating, simply filling out a tax return will not lead to criminal 
sanctions.114
Tax protestors have also invoked the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
prohibition on slavery and involuntary servitude.115 This contention 
asserts that income taxes require an individual to work for the benefit of 
another, the government, without the individual’s consent.116 However, 
individuals are not required to work and tax is due only on income. Thus, 
an individual is not involuntarily laboring for another.117 Moreover, even 
“if the requirements of the tax laws were to be classified as servitude, 
they would not be the kind of involuntary servitude referred to in the 
Thirteenth Amendment.”118
Another popular tax protestor claim is that an individual is not a 
citizen who is subject to the income tax. This argument is based on the 
contention that the taxpayer is not a United States citizen but is instead 
the citizen of a state, a natural and freeborn person, or a nonresident 
alien.119 This position often involves an assertion that the payment of 
income taxes is required only of federal employees and residents of the 
District of Columbia.120 Tax protestors further reason that if they are not 
 112. Tax protestors often assert a blanket Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination; such risk of incrimination does not exist in most cases, although in limited cases 
disclosure of the source or amount of income or other specific information could be incriminating. 
See, e.g., Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 41–42 (1968) (allowing a taxpayer to make a 
claim of privilege under the Fifth Amendment where the filing of the return would by itself be 
incriminating); United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 263–64 (1927) (concluding that although there 
may be cases where completion of a return will constitute self-incrimination that would entitle the 
taxpayer to “plead the Fifth,” a blanket assertion of privilege was not available); United States v. 
Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304, 1311 (5th Cir. 1978) (concluding that a taxpayer or a tax protestor did not 
have a right under the Fifth Amendment to not report income that was earned in an illegal activity); 
Jackson, supra note 13, at 308–09; Riley, supra note 110. 
 113. See, e.g., Sullivan, 274 U.S. at 264; United States v. Neff, 615 F.2d 1235, 1240–41 (9th 
Cir. 1980); United States v. Schiff, 612 F.2d 73, 83 (2d Cir. 1979); see also THE TRUTH, supra note 
97, at 22–23. 
 114. Sullivan, 274 U.S. at 274. 
 115. See, e.g., THE TRUTH, supra note 97, at 22–23. 
 116. Id. at 23–24; Jackson, supra note 13, at 310. 
 117. Jackson, supra note 13, at 310. 
 118. Porth v. Brodick, 214 F.2d 925, 926 (10th Cir. 1954). 
 119. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 13, at 310. 
 120. See, e.g., United States v. Raymond, 228 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2000). 
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citizens of the United States, they are not subject to the income tax. 
Some variants of this position require an individual to renounce all ties to 
the government and declare her status as a sovereign citizen.121 
However, there is no legitimate distinction between state citizenship and 
federal citizenship for tax purposes. 
Some protestors argue that the income tax violates equal protection 
because it treats married taxpayers and single taxpayers differently.122 
Courts have rejected this argument as the income tax does not affect any 
fundamental rights or any suspect class of citizens.123 These examples 
demonstrate some, but not all, of the frivolous claims that tax protestors 
raise relating to the validity and applicability of the income tax. 
2. Other challenges 
One of the most popular arguments that does not involve the 
Constitution is the argument that paying income tax is voluntary.124 
People asserting this position have misconstrued the description of our 
tax system as “voluntary” to mean that the payment of tax is “optional,” 
which the courts have concluded is clearly incorrect.125
Tax protestors also assert that wages are not income because they 
result from the individual’s labor.126 They argue that the value of the 
labor provided is equal to the amount of money received and therefore 
the laborer has no gain and, consequently, no tax liability.127
Some protestors challenge the IRS’s authority to collect taxes, 
claiming that the IRS is not really a government agency.128 These 
taxpayers claim that the IRS is a Delaware corporation without the legal 
 121. THE TRUTH, supra note 97, at 1–4 (discussing Jonathan D. Luman’s “Tax Buster” 
program). 
 122. Jackson, supra note 13, at 309–10. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See, e.g., THE TRUTH, supra note 97, at 1–4; United States v. Marsh, 144 F.3d 1229, 
1231 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Barnett, 945 F.2d 1296, 1299–1300 (5th Cir. 1991); see also 
Jackson, supra note 13, at 318 (noting the fact that tax protestor claims that they need not pay taxes 
is based on a mistaken interpretation of the self-reporting nature of the tax system). 
 125. See, e.g., United States v. Middleton, 246 F.3d 825, 840–41 (6th Cir. 2001) (concluding 
that the trial court had not erred by instructing the jury that “voluntary” was not the same as 
“optional”). 
 126. The courts have rejected this argument. See, e.g., Barnett, 945 F.2d at 1298. 
 127. See generally Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass, Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955); THE TRUTH, supra 
note 97, at 7–11; Jackson, supra note 13, at 314; John W. Wright, Note, Taxation: Frivolous Tax 
Litigation: Pecuniary Sanctions against Taxpayers and Their Attorneys, 39 OKLA. L. REV. 156, 
156–57 (1986). 
 128. Jackson, supra note 13, at 313–14. 
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ability to collect taxes.129 This argument clearly fails, however, because 
the Secretary of the Treasury has the authority to create the IRS and to 
delegate to the IRS the power to enforce the tax laws.130
Additionally, protestors claim that Federal Reserve notes are not 
legal tender because they cannot be redeemed for gold or silver,131 
despite the delegation in the Constitution to Congress to establish legal 
tender.132 These protestors argue that when they are paid with Federal 
Reserve Notes they do not receive “real money” for their labor and, 
therefore, they have no income that can be taxed.133 The tax protestors 
asserting this position claim that the currency became worthless when the 
United States moved off of the gold standard.134 In addition, tax 
protestors reason that if there is no legal tender, they cannot be liable for 
a tax debt denominated in such a currency.135
Finally, a very common tax protestor claim is referred to as “the 
section 861 position.”136 This argument looks to the language of I.R.C. 
section 861 through 865, and uses the language of those sections as the 
basis for a contention that wages and other earnings received by U.S. 
citizens in the U.S. are not income.137 However, these are sourcing rules, 
used only to determine whether income is U.S. or foreign source 
income.138 This position has been repeatedly rejected as frivolous.139
In addition, taxpayers who object to funding the military on moral, 
religious, or philosophical grounds have attempted to withhold payment 
of all or part of their taxes.140 Such taxpayers generally claim a credit or 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See, e.g., United States v. Wangrud, 533 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1976) (rejecting this 
argument); Wright, supra note 127, at 157. 
 132. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5. 
 133. See Zuger v. United States, 834 F.2d 1009, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 1987); United States v. 
Davenport, 824 F.2d 1511 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Condo, 741 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1984); 
United States v. Rickman, 638 F.2d 182 (10th Cir. 1980). 
 134. Condo, 741 F.2d at 238. 
 135. See, e.g., United States v. Ware, 608 F.2d 400 (10th Cir. 1979). 
 136. Rev. Rul. 2004-30, 2004-1 C.B. 622 (discussing the so-called “section 861 position” and 
the possible civil and criminal penalties available to taxpayers asserting this position to deny their 
tax liability). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See e.g., id.; United States v. Bell, 414 F.3d 474 (3d Cir. 2005); Takaba v. Comm’r, 119 
T.C. 18 (2002). 
 140. See, e.g., Adams v. Comm’r, 170 F.3d 173, 174–75 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussing the 
taxpayer’s willingness to pay her taxes if they would be placed in a fund that did not pay for military 
spending, paying for which violated her religious beliefs, or if the government would otherwise 
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refund of the amount that they believe is attributable to the war effort.141 
Because the Constitution grants Congress the power to collect taxes and 
use revenues for the general good, courts have rejected taxpayers’ refusal 
to comply with the tax laws on moral, religious, or philosophical 
grounds.142
As the sample of arguments discussed in this section has 
demonstrated, the arguments used by tax protestors are extremely varied. 
The one thing that all tax protestor arguments have in common is that 
they are frivolous. However, because tax protestors often use an 
amalgamation of these arguments with their filings or in their court 
filings, it may be difficult to identify whether a particular case includes 
legitimate claims along with the frivolous rhetoric. To provide a context 
within which to understand the need for a penalty equal to the costs 
associated with collection of tax from a tax protestor be imposed on tax 
protestors, it is first necessary to understand the opportunities available 
to taxpayers to challenge their tax liability. This context is important to 
clarify why tax protestors cannot be simply shut out of the system and 
how tax protestors impose significant costs on the government. The next 
Section discusses the tax collection process and the rights afforded to 
taxpayers during the collection process. 
IV. TAX COLLECTION AND TAXPAYER COLLECTION RIGHTS 
This Section provides a brief description of the tax collection and 
review process. This Section also provides a framework for 
understanding potential costs and the need for penalties to compensate 
for abuse of the tax system. Part A discusses tax collection generally. 
Part B discusses some of the new taxpayer rights created by Internal 
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 1998).143
A. Tax Collection Generally 
There are three primary parts to the tax collection process: (1) 
determination of the tax liability, (2) payment of the tax liability, and (3) 
accommodate her beliefs); see also THE TRUTH, supra note 97, at 13–14 (explaining protestors’ use 
of the rationale that there can be no tax imposed in an invalid currency); Kornhauser, supra note 13, 
at 943 (distinguishing conscientious tax protestors from tax protestors who do not have a moral 
objection, just a monetary objection, to paying taxes). 
 141. Wright, supra note 127, at 160. 
 142. Id. at 161 (citations omitted). 
 143. Pub. L. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998) (codified as amended in various sections of 26 
U.S.C.). 
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challenge of the tax liability, which in some cases may occur before 
payment. At each stage, taxpayers have an opportunity to interact with 
the IRS and often with the courts. Thus, there are several opportunities 
for a taxpayer with legitimate concerns or challenges to an asserted tax 
liability to present her concerns or challenges and to arrive at a 
resolution. As a result, those who want to delay or frustrate the tax 
collection system also have numerous opportunities to do so, which can 
be very costly to the tax collection system and the courts. 
1. Determination of tax liability 
Tax liabilities may be determined in two ways: (1) self-reporting and 
(2) IRS determination. The Service determines tax liabilities by 
conducting audits,144 by matching self-reported returns with information 
returns,145 and by identifying errors on filed returns.146 With third-party 
information statements, the Service can match the amount reported by 
the payee to the amount reported by the payor to determine whether the 
taxpayer has properly reported taxable income.147 Mandatory 
withholding and third-party information reporting eliminate the 
opportunity for most taxpayers to underreport their income without 
 144. An audit may be conducted in several ways. First, an audit may be conducted by 
correspondence, with the Service requesting that the taxpayer provide documentation to the auditor 
by mail. Second, an audit may be conducted in the local IRS office. Third, an audit may be 
conducted at the taxpayer’s residence or place of business. Finally, as in the case of many large 
corporations, the audit may be continuous and conducted on an ongoing basis at the taxpayer’s place 
of business, by on-site IRS personnel. In addition, an audit of a taxpayer’s liability may be either 
partial (examining only some of the taxpayer’s reported items) or complete (examining the 
taxpayer’s entire return). Audits are generally performed by examiners or auditors who work for the 
IRS in the examination division. See generally, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INTERNAL REVENUE 
MANUAL (CCH), pt. 4, available at http://www.irs.gov./irm/index.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2005) 
[hereinafter IRM]. 
 145. Examples of information returns filed by third parties include Form W-2 Wage 
Statements, issued to employees by employers; and Forms 1099, which are issued by a variety of 
payors to payees of items such as interest, pensions, miscellaneous items, etc. 
 146. Such determination may result from a math error adjustment, I.R.C. §§ 6201, 6213 
(2000), or from a determination on audit. 
 147. Some problems with matching have occurred. For instance, the Service temporarily 
discontinued a program that matched partnership items reported on a Form K-1 with items that are 
reported on the partner’s tax return because of reported errors and problems with accurate matching. 
The “bugs” in this program had to be worked out, after which the program was restarted. 
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detection.148 Even for taxpayers subject to withholding or third-party 
information reporting, a self-reported return must be filed.149
The Service may examine or audit a filed return regardless of 
whether there is a reported balance due. Based on the audit, the Service 
may determine that the taxpayer correctly reported, overreported, or 
underreported her tax liability. Audits have a positive effect on tax 
compliance but are costly and time consuming.150 Currently less than 
one percent of all returns are audited.151
Taxpayers not subject to mandatory withholding, including domestic 
business entities, self-employed persons, and sole proprietorships, are 
those most likely to underreport their income.152 Estimates suggest that 
approximately eighty percent of the tax gap is attributable to 
underreporting.153 Thus, the majority of enforcement resources available 
should be used to detect underreporting among taxpayers not subject to 
mandatory withholding.154
2. Payment of tax liability 
After the tax liability is determined, the tax due must be paid. 
Payment may already have occurred as a result of mandatory 
withholding or the payment of tax deposits. In fact, tax compliance 
begins and ends with a self-reported return for most wage earners and 
taxpayers whose income is subject to information reporting and 
withholding because there is little opportunity to underreport or avoid 
payment.155
 148. See supra note 4. 
 149. This is also often referred to as self-assessment, although that term is misleading. An 
assessment does not occur until it is made by the IRS. I.R.C. § 6201 (2000). See Camp, supra note 
73, at 1551 (commenting on the inaccuracy of casual references to self-assessment and the 
confusions such references may cause). 
 150. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
 151. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 152. See supra note 4. 
 153. Id. 
 154. In 2002, 174,585,000 returns were filed. IRS REPORT TO CONGRESS: IRS TAX 
COMPLIANCE ACTIVITIES (July 2003). Also in 2002, the IRS made a total of 15,873,290 compliance 
contacts—13,315,765; 1,449,139; 242,637; and 823,749 contacts related to math error, 
underreporting, automated substitute returns, and examination, respectively. Id. 
 155. See, e.g., Stalans, Smith & Kinsey, supra note 39, at 502 (concluding that not only do 
these taxpayers have greater opportunity to avoid taxes but also they are more likely to be involved 
in groups that are more accepting of tax avoidance, i.e., groups that have “less stringent norms 
against tax cheating”). 
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In other cases, a taxpayer’s liabilities are not satisfied through 
withholding or tax deposits. Payment for any remaining liability is due at 
the time the taxpayer’s tax return is due, without extensions. 
However, some taxpayers do not pay their taxes at the time of filing. 
In these cases, the Service assesses the reported amount due. After 
assessment, the IRS may begin collection actions, which first require the 
Service to give notice of the unpaid liability and make a demand for 
payment.156 Although a lien arises automatically for unpaid taxes,157 to 
obtain priority over other creditors, the Service must file a Notice of 
Federal Tax Lien.158 In addition, the Service may pursue collection by 
seizing or levying on the taxpayer’s property.159
3. Challenge of tax liability 
When the Service determines that additional amounts are due, the 
taxpayer sometimes has an opportunity to challenge the determination 
administratively and judicially before assessment.160 After assessment, 
the taxpayer can pay the tax and request a refund, an administrative or 
judicial process.161
The opportunity to challenge a tax liability is not limited to 
challenges to IRS determinations of additional amounts due. Even 
taxpayers who self-report a liability or fail to challenge the determination 
of a deficiency have at least one opportunity to challenge. Taxpayers in 
the United States are entitled to more opportunities to challenge the 
amount of tax due than those of any other country.162 First, after 
 156. I.R.C. § 6303 (2000). 
 157. Id. § 6321. 
 158. Id. § 6323. 
 159. Id. § 6331. Prior to levy, a notice of intent to levy must generally be provided thirty days 
in advance. Id. In addition, the taxpayer must be given notice of the taxpayer’s right to a Collection 
Due Process Hearing. Id. § 6330. This right is discussed below. See supra Part IV.B.1. Additional 
protections shield some property from levy. Id. § 6334. In addition, approval is required before the 
Service can collect by levy on a principal residence. Id. § 6334(e). 
 160. A judicial challenge is not available in all instances. I.R.C. § 6213 provides jurisdiction in 
the Tax Court only for deficiency redeterminations in income, estate, gift, and certain excise tax 
cases. 
 161. I.R.C. § 6523. 
 162. Although no proposal has ever been made to eliminate all judicial review and is unlikely 
to be seriously considered, it is unclear whether refund jurisdiction is constitutionally required for 
tax liabilities. See Harold Dubroff & Dan S. Grossman, The United States Tax Court: An Historical 
Analysis, Part VI, 42 ALB. L. REV. 191, 210 n.166 (1977) (citing Rockwell v. United States, 512 
F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1975)). No proposal has even been made to do this, and it would seem contrary to 
the United States’ history of requiring process in tax collection. 
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payment of the liability, a taxpayer requesting a refund is entitled to 
consideration of the request and if the request is denied or is not 
answered within six months, the taxpayer may file suit in the United 
States District Court or the Court of Federal Claims.163
Another opportunity for judicial review may exist when the Service 
pursues collection of an unpaid liability. After a Notice of Federal Tax 
Lien or issuance of a Notice of Intent to Levy is filed, the taxpayer is 
entitled to challenge the collection action and, sometimes, the underlying 
liability, during a collection due process (CDP) hearing, which 
culminates in an opportunity for judicial review.164 This right is 
discussed in the next Part. 
In addition, even if the taxpayer is not at a stage where she is entitled 
to judicial review, there may be opportunities to challenge the liability 
administratively. Administrative challenges may involve discussions 
with a revenue officer or an auditor, appeal to the IRS employee’s 
manager, or consideration by the IRS Office of Appeals.165
All taxpayers are given access to these processes. In most instances 
taxpayers are not required to raise or avoid particular arguments to gain 
access to review. However, the issues that may be raised are not 
unlimited. For instance, statute of limitations may limit the years that 
may be considered by a court.166 In addition, the court’s jurisdiction may 
 163. The taxpayer is also entitled to judicial review if the taxpayer does not receive an 
administrative response to the refund claim within six months. Id. § 6532. 
 164. I.R.C. §§ 6320, 6330. 
 165. See IRM, supra note 144, at 8.1.1.2.2. The issues that the Appeals Office may consider 
include determinations of income, estate, gift, employment and excise taxes; liabilities and additions 
to tax and penalties; collection due process; offers-in-compromise; abatement of interest; 
administrative costs under I.R.C. § 7430; jeopardy levies; and recommendations concerning 
settlement offers in refund suits. Id.; see also MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE ¶ 9.03[2] (rev. 2d ed. Supp. 2005). The IRS Office of Appeals is an independent 
department of the IRS, which is designed to address concerns raised by taxpayers about the actions 
taken by other IRS offices. IRM, supra note 144, § 8.1.1.1. The Appeals Office’s mission begins, 
The Appeals mission is to resolve tax controversies, without litigation, on a basis which 
is fair and impartial to both the Government and the taxpayer and in a manner that will 
enhance voluntary compliance and public confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the 
Service. The Appeals program is designed to effectively carry out the Appeals mission. 
Id. at 8.1.1.1.2. The independence of the Appeals Office was statutorily confirmed by RRA 1998, § 
1001(a)(4). See generally H.R. REP. NO. 105-599 (1998) (Conf. Rep.); SALTZMAN, supra, ¶ 9.01, at 
9-5 (“In the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 . . . the Office of Appeals was not only 
acknowledged, but its independence was required to be protected.”). Ex parte communications 
occurring after October 23, 2000 between the Appeals Officer and other IRS employees are limited. 
Rev. Proc. 2000-43, 2000-2 C.B. 404. 
 166. In most cases, the statute of limitations prevents assessment of a liability more than three 
years after the date on which the return was filed. I.R.C. § 6501(a). One important exception to this 
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be limited.167 Finally, in a few instances, a statute may limit the issues 
that can be considered at an administrative proceeding.168
An additional limitation may be imposed when a particular taxpayer 
has repeatedly raised an argument that the courts have found to be 
without merit. In these cases, courts sometimes enjoin a taxpayer from 
bringing another action against the IRS or its employees until the 
taxpayer demonstrates that he is not raising the same frivolous 
arguments.169 However, this is an extreme remedy that is not often 
imposed. 
The number of opportunities to dispute a tax liability with the IRS 
and in court provide ample opportunity to ensure that the right amount of 
tax is collected. However, tax protestors may use the number of available 
opportunities to their advantage. These opportunities can be used to slow 
the collection process and are costly in terms of both the resources 
needed to pursue collection from intransigent taxpayers and the unpaid 
tax liability. 
Notwithstanding the possibility that these processes can be abused, 
their availability is important to voluntary compliance. It would be easy, 
and often is tempting, to bar people who raise time-worn, repeatedly 
rejected, frivolous tax protestor claims from accessing the administrative 
and judicial systems.170 Barring a particular group of taxpayers from 
challenging tax liabilities could harm the perception of the fairness of the 
tax system. First, in some cases legitimate issues could be buried in the 
tax protestor rhetoric. Because of this, simply dismissing the claims out 
of hand would likely increase both real and perceived unfairness. 
rule applies in cases of an omission of more than twenty-five percent of the gross income that should 
have been stated on the return, which will allow up to six years for the Service to make an 
assessment. I.R.C. § 6501(e). Moreover, if no return is filed, a false return is filed, or the taxpayer 
willfully attempts to defeat or evade the tax, an assessment may be made at any time. I.R.C. § 
6501(c). 
 167. The Tax Court’s jurisdiction is limited. See I.R.C. §§ 6213, 7442. Moreover, the district 
court and court of claims have jurisdiction only in refund requests and CDP appeals where the Tax 
Court would not have jurisdiction over the underlying liability. I.R.C. § 6330(d)(2). 
 168. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6330(c) (limiting the issues that can be raised in a CDP hearing); id. § 
6404 (limiting the review of a denied request for abatement of interest to whether the IRS abused its 
discretion). 
 169. I.R.C. § 7421 (barring suits to prevent or restrain the assessment or collection of tax). 
 170. Recently, one court said that simply wishing to raise only frivolous tax-protestor 
arguments was not a valid reason to deny a CDP hearing. Hinman v. Grzesiowski, No. 3:05-CV-049 
RM (N.D. Ind. May 10, 2005). But see Lunsford v. Comm’r, 117 T.C. 183 (2001) (concluding that it 
was unnecessary to remand a case back to the Appeals Office even though no hearing had been 
conducted because to do so would be “neither necessary or productive”). 
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Second, barring some issues would present the challenge of determining 
which issues should be precluded and could create a fear that particular 
groups, rather than ideas, were being barred from access to relief. This 
could lead to a concern that people who are less pleasant to deal with 
might be barred access to the system. Finally, because tax protestors tend 
to be a vocal group, they would likely widely broadcast their exclusion 
from the system. This could signal to compliant taxpayers the possibility 
of exclusion, and the confidentiality of taxpayer information would 
prevent the Service from adequately answering charges that such 
exclusions were unfair. Many taxpayers, unaware of the strict nature of 
the legal prohibition against disclosure of taxpayer information by the 
Service, could interpret the Service’s silence as a tacit admission that the 
tax protestors’ allegations have merit. As a result, such silence could be 
deleterious to voluntary tax compliance. 
The belief that the IRS acts unfairly in collecting taxes also affects 
the perceived fairness of the tax system. Concerns about the Service’s 
collection practices were brought to the forefront in the Senate Finance 
Committee hearings conducted in 1997 and 1998.171 The next Part 
discusses the changes to taxpayer rights and the tax collection system as 
a result of these hearings. Additional rights provide additional 
opportunities for tax protestors to avoid payment and increase the cost to 
the government of pursuing collection of taxes from tax protestors. 
B. Some Changes in Taxpayer Rights Resulting from RRA 1998 
After the 1997 and 1998 hearings, Congress enacted RRA 1998.172 
RRA 1998 was intended to combat the IRS abuses that were alleged 
during the hearings. However, concerns about the means used to collect 
taxes are certainly not new. Moreover, considering that over 130 million 
individual tax returns along with many other tax returns are filed each 
year, such concerns are inevitable; no matter how hard any agency that 
works with so many people tries, errors will occur. RRA 1998 made 
some necessary and some unnecessary or ineffective changes to the tax 
 171. Practices and Procedures of the Internal Revenue Serv.: Hearings Before the S. Comm. 
on Finance, 105th Cong. (1997). These hearings were convened on September 23–25, 1997. 
Hearings on “IRS Restructuring” were held on January 28–29 and February 5, 11, and 25, 1998. IRS 
Restructuring: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 105th Cong. 1 (1998). Hearings on “IRS 
Oversight” were held on April 28–May 1, 1998. IRS Oversight: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on 
Finance, 105th Cong. 1 (1998). 
 172. Pub. L. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998) (codified as amended in various sections of 26 
U.S.C.). 
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collection system, including the creation of collection due process rights 
and the prohibition against designating a taxpayer to be an illegal tax 
protestor. These changes are discussed below. 
1. Collection Due Process 
One of the new taxpayer rights created by RRA 1998 was the right to 
a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing.173 CDP hearings are conducted 
by an impartial appeals officer174 when a CDP hearing is requested 
within thirty days of the issuance of a Notice of Federal Tax Lien175 or a 
Notice of Intent to Levy.176 Except in limited cases, a timely request for 
a CDP hearing stops a levy during the administrative and judicial 
processes.177 While CDP is an important right, and judicial review is a 
necessary component, it is also subject to abuse. Tax protestors in 
particular may use CDP as a means of delaying tax collection and 
frustrating their obligation to timely pay their share of the cost of 
government. 
During a CDP hearing, the appeals officer verifies the tax assessment 
and the Service’s compliance with the applicable laws, considers 
collection alternatives, and balances the need for efficient collection 
against the taxpayer’s interests.178 The appeals officer then issues a 
notice of determination stating whether collection may proceed.179 If the 
taxpayer is not satisfied with the determination, the taxpayer may seek 
judicial review, which is generally conducted to determine whether the 
appeals officer abused her discretion.180
The availability of CDP hearings and review may cause the public to 
perceive the system as being fairer. That perception would be consistent 
 173. I.R.C. §§ 6320, 6330 (2000). 
 174. Id. § 6330(b)(3). 
 175. Id. § 6320(a). 
 176. Id. § 6330(a)(3), (b). There is a right to a CDP hearing when either event occurs. 
 177. Levy is not precluded if tax is in jeopardy. Id. § 6330. Levy may also occur during a 
judicial appeal if the underlying liability is not at issue and the IRS shows good cause for collection 
to proceed. Id. § 6330. 
 178. Id. § 6330(c)(2). In cases where a notice of deficiency was not issued and there was no 
prior opportunity to challenge the underlying liability, the taxpayer may also challenge the 
underlying liability at the CDP hearing. Id. § 6330(c)(2)(B). 
 179. Id. § 6330(c)(3). 
 180. Id. § 6330(d). Appeal is to the Tax Court if it would have jurisdiction over the underlying 
liability and to the district court if the Tax Court would not have jurisdiction over the underlying 
liability. Review of a challenge to the underlying liability, if permitted by I.R.C. section 6330, is de 
novo. 
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with Congress’ intent, which was expressed in the committee report as 
follows: 
The Committee believes that taxpayers are entitled to protections 
in dealing with the IRS that are similar to those they would have 
in dealing with any other creditor. Accordingly, the Committee 
believes that the IRS should afford taxpayers adequate notice of 
collection activity and a meaningful hearing before the IRS 
deprives them of their property. . . . The Committee believes that 
following procedures designed to afford taxpayers due process in 
collections will increase fairness to taxpayers.181
However, some have argued that CDP is a waste of resources that is 
potentially, if not actually, harmful to taxpayers.182 If the taxpayer has 
multiple tax liabilities but has sought a CDP hearing and review of only 
selected tax liabilities, the taxpayer’s assets will not actually be protected 
because the bar on levy that results from the CDP hearing request will 
halt collection only of the particular years’, period, and tax liabilities that 
are the subject of that CDP notice.183 However, many taxpayers who 
seek a CDP hearing will not have unpaid liabilities relating to years that 
are not included in the CDP notice, or for which the time to request a 
CDP hearing has expired. 
Further, CDP requires the use of significant judicial and 
administrative resources.184 The examination and collection functions 
participate in the CDP hearing, which the appeals office conducts. If the 
taxpayer appeals a CDP determination, the Service or the Department of 
Justice attorneys will have to answer the petition, prepare or respond to 
motions and, in some cases, prepare for and conduct a trial. Judicial 
resources used include the time spent on motions and trials.185
Although many CDP cases are resolved at the appeals office level, 
those that are appealed to the courts disproportionately involve frivolous 
 181. S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 67 (1998). 
 182. Camp, supra note 73. 
 183. Id. Camp notes that once the house is gone, it does not really matter whether it was taken 
to pay the taxes for year X or for year Y; the effect is the same. 
 184. Bryan T. Camp, The Failure of CDP, Part 2: Why It Adds No Value, 104 Tax Notes 
1567, 1570–72 (2004). 
 185. Chief Counsel defends the Service in cases heard by the United States Tax Court. The 
United States Department of Justice defends the Treasury Department and the Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue in cases brought in the United States district courts and in the United States Court 
of Federal Claims. 
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tax-protestor claims.186 Thus, in the CDP context, the consumption of 
administrative and judicial resources by frivolous positions remains a 
particularly important concern.187 The number of litigated CDP cases 
that involved frivolous issues dropped from fifty percent in 2003 to 
twenty-three percent in 2005; however, this level is still too high.188 
Some believe that the proper response to such a high rate of frivolous 
claims (and other problems with CDP) is to eliminate judicial review of 
CDP. 189
This conclusion is inadequate because it fails to acknowledge the 
benefits that CDP and judicial review of the CDP determination provide 
to tax administration. First, taxpayers may be able to successfully 
negotiate mutually satisfactory resolutions by working with a different 
representative of the Service, the appeals officer.190 Many tax collection 
issues are resolved in the appeals office during the CDP hearing; most 
CDP cases do not involve judicial review.191 As noted by the National 
Taxpayer Advocate in her 2004 Annual Report to Congress, “[t]hese 
safety valves make taxpayers feel that the tax system is, after all, 
ultimately fair and balanced.”192 However, judicial review is a necessary 
component of CDP. The availability of judicial review not only provides 
assurances that the Appeals Office will properly perform its functions, 
but it likely increases the perceived fairness of the process.193
Just as with other aspects of tax collection, tax protestors cannot be 
barred from using CDP without adversely impacting general perceptions 
of fairness. Therefore, a solution short of shutting tax protestors out of 
the system is needed. As discussed below, this can be done by requiring 
 186. Camp, supra note 73. Only about five percent of the CDP hearing requests raise frivolous 
claims; however, those claims account for a disproportionate amount of resources and appeals. 
STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 2003 REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION 
RELATING TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AS REQUIRED BY THE IRS REFORM AND 
RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998, appendix 1, 22–23 (JCX-53-03). 
 187. Camp, supra note 73, at 1047. 
 188. Id. (citing the 2004 Annual Report of the National Taxpayer Advocate). 
 189. Id.; Danshera Cords, Reforming, Not Replacing, CDP, 108 TAX NOTES 817 (2005). 
 190. I.R.C. §6330(c) (2000); see also Cords, supra note 189, at 818. 
 191. Some practitioners have reported that it is often easier to establish an installment 
agreement or an offer in comprise when working with an Appeals Officer than when working with a 
revenue officer. These practitioners often seek to move the collection process along to the issuance 
of the CDP notice. 
 192. NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERVICE, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, 
Preface at vii (2004). 
 193. Cords, supra note 189, at 821–22. 
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people raising only tax protestor positions to pay for the cost of those 
challenges at both the administrative and judicial level. 
2. Illegal tax protestor designation 
Another concern raised during the 1997 and 1998 Senate hearings 
was a concern that the IRS’s practice of labeling some taxpayers as 
“Illegal Tax Protestors,” or ITPs, created stigma for taxpayers.194 There 
were also concerns that after a taxpayer was identified as an ITP, the 
designation might remain, even if the taxpayer subsequently came into 
compliance.195 As a result of this concern, RRA 1998 bars the IRS from 
designating a taxpayer as an illegal tax protestor.196 As required by 
section 3707 of RRA 1998, the IRS has expended significant effort to 
eliminate all references to illegal tax protestors in the Internal Revenue 
Manual, employee training, and taxpayer master files.197
However well-intentioned banning the use of the ITP label was, it 
may frustrate efficient tax administration. In addition, this is another 
example of a reaction to a concern expressed during the hearings that 
may impede the IRS’s ability to collect taxes from some taxpayers. Such 
a designation can provide important information to tax collectors. It 
identifies the types of arguments that are likely to be presented and 
allows tax officials to prepare for the likely responses to collection 
efforts. In addition, section 3707’s bar of the “ITP” designation simply 
means that different, possibly less accurate or informative labels, are 
used. Instead of identifying tax protestors or tax protestor arguments, the 
IRS now identifies the much broader categories of abusive tax schemes 
or scams.198 The tax schemes and scams that are identified include those 
 194. S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 105 (1998). 
 195. Id. 
 196. RRA 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3707, 112 Stat. 685, 778 (1998) (uncodified). 
 197. TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, FISCAL YEAR 2005 
STATUTORY AUDIT OF COMPLIANCE WITH LEGAL GUIDELINES PROHIBITING THE USE OF ILLEGAL 
TAX PROTESTER AND SIMILAR DESIGNATIONS, REP. NO. 2005-40-104 (2005). In its most recent 
report on IRS compliance with section 3707 of RRA 1998, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax 
Administration concluded that the IRS was largely in compliance. Id. The report identified only 309 
instances in which it found references to illegal tax protestors. Id. at 2. Primarily these references 
were made in case narratives prepared by IRS personnel. Id. 
 198. On its web site, the IRS has a page devoted to links that help a taxpayer identify “tax 
scams.” http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=106788,00.html (last visited Dec. 20, 
2005). Included in the information available is a fifty-six-page document, The Truth About Frivolous 
Tax Arguments, supra note 97. The IRS also changed the designation of the taxpayers. See, e.g., IRS 
Fact Sheet 2005-15, IRS Obtains More Than 100 Injunctions Against Tax Scheme Promoters (Apr. 
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that would have resulted in an ITP designation before RRA 1998 as well 
as other aggressive positions such as tax shelters. 
Even assuming that banning the ITP label addresses a real problem, 
lumping tax protestors and tax shelters together may reduce the IRS’s 
ability to target enforcement resources effectively. An effective means of 
pursuing collection from a tax protestor may not be as effective to collect 
a tax liability from someone who purchased a tax shelter and vice versa. 
Barring the Service from using the ITP designation is an incomplete 
solution. In addition, the courts are not impacted by section 3707. 
Because they are not prevented from using the ITP designation, courts 
continue to apply this label.199 This leads to inconsistent descriptions of 
the same behavior. 
Prohibiting the IRS from identifying some taxpayers as tax protestors 
does not promote effective tax administration, as it does nothing to stop 
their arguments or bring them into compliance. On the other hand, this 
prohibition may make it harder to identify and efficiently interact with 
tax protestors. More effective means of addressing the concerns of 
stigma or the possibility of an unreasonable refusal to remove an ITP 
designation are needed. 
As tax collection relates to tax protestors, RRA 1998 may make it 
even harder to ensure collection. However, because perceptions of 
fairness are critical to tax administration, such rights may be necessary, 
and exclusion of tax protestors as a group would be ill advised. 
Therefore, a means of recovering from tax protestors the additional cost 
of collection that stems from their illegal acts is necessary. 
V. TAX PENALTIES 
This Section will first consider the justifications for the imposition of 
penalties. Next, it will look at the types of tax penalties that are currently 
available. The Internal Revenue Code distinguishes between additions to 
tax200 and penalties;201 however, both are relevant in this context and 
will collectively be referred to as penalties. Although the focus of this 
2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/ 
0,,id=137831,00.html. 
 199. United States v. Bell, 414 F.3d 474, 475 (3rd Cir. 2005); Izen v. Catalina, 398 F.3d 363, 
365 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 200. I.R.C. §§ 6651–6658 (2000). 
 201. Id. §§ 6662–6663 (discussing accuracy and fraud-related penalties); Id. §§ 6671–6720 
(discussing assessable penalties); Id. §§ 6721–6723 (relating to penalties for failure to provide 
information reports). 
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Article is on civil penalties imposed on frivolous claims, this does not 
suggest that civil and criminal penalties are, or should be, mutually 
exclusive. Both criminal and civil penalties can be imposed on a single 
act,202 and civil penalties are often used in conjunction with criminal 
sanctions.203
This Section provides background for the Article’s proposal that 
additional penalties need to be imposed on tax protestors, despite the fact 
that penalties do not appear to deter tax protestors’ behavior. Such 
penalties are needed to reimburse the government’s costs of collection 
and to provide a fair result to both compliant taxpayers and tax 
protestors. 
A. Justifications for the Imposition of Tax Penalties 
Some commentators have suggested that lower compliance may 
result if penalties are too high,204 while other commentators have 
suggested that current penalties are adequate to deal with both tax 
protestors and their attorneys.205 However, the appropriate level of 
penalty depends on the reason for imposing penalties and how those 
penalties interact with the tax administration system. 
Tax penalties address a variety of tax noncompliance situations. 
Possible justifications for imposing penalties include deterrence, 
punishment, and reimbursement or compensation for the costs imposed 
on or incurred by the government. Although most tax penalties are 
intended to deter tax avoidance,206 remediation and compensation have 
also been used to explain the imposition of civil tax penalties.207 The 
Supreme Court has stated, 
 202. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938) (“Congress may impose both a criminal 
and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or omission; for the double jeopardy clause prohibits 
merely punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally, for the same offense.”). 
However, civil penalties can only be added to criminal sanctions if the civil penalties are remedial 
rather than deterrent or retributive in nature. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 437, 449 (1989). 
 203. See, e.g., Badarraco v. United States, 464 U.S. 386, 396 (1984). 
 204. See, e.g., Lederman, Interplay, supra note 24, at 1485 (questioning Professor Kahan’s 
conclusion that high penalties might reduce compliance). 
 205. Wright, supra note 127. 
 206. See, e.g.,  Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 399 (1938) (“To ensure full and honest disclosure, to 
discourage fraudulent attempts to evade the tax, Congress imposes sanctions. Such sanctions may 
confessedly be either criminal or civil.”); Donald Arthur Winslow, Tax Penalties—“They Shoot 
Dogs Don’t They?”, 43 FLA. L. REV. 811, 857–63 (1991); see also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 
372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963) (noting that deterrence and retribution are traditional reasons for 
punishment in criminal cases). 
 207. Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 401. 
2CORDS.FIN.DOC 3/14/2006 5:16:09 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2005 
1554 
 
The remedial character of sanctions imposing additions to tax has been 
made clear by this Court in passing upon similar legislation. They are 
provided primarily as a safeguard for the protection of the revenue and 
to reimburse the Government for the heavy expense of investigation 
and the loss resulting from the taxpayer’s fraud.208
Criminal sanctions, which have a much higher standard of proof and 
may result in incarceration, are less frequently imposed, but nonetheless 
have a significant deterrent effect.209 Criminal penalties may be imposed 
for certain types of willful tax avoidance.210 Civil penalties are imposed 
more frequently but their deterrent effect may be less than that of 
criminal penalties. More important in deterring tax noncompliance are a 
taxpayer’s internalized norms regarding the importance of tax 
compliance.211
The penalties that are frequently used against tax protestors, 
including the frivolous filing penalty212 and the frivolous litigation 
position penalty in the Tax Court,213 may be relatively small compared 
to the resources needed to pursue collection. In addition, monetary 
penalties may not deter the tax avoidance behavior of tax protestors. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Stark, supra note 49, at 117 (noting that jail is a consequence that many are unwilling to 
risk). 
 210. I.R.C. § 7201 (2000) (making it a felony to willfully evade or defeat tax); id. § 7202 
(making it a felony to willfully fail to collect or pay over tax); id. § 7206 (making it a felony to 
commit fraud or make false statements); id. § 7207 (making it a crime to willfully file a fraudulent 
return or file a false statement); id. § 7212 (making it a crime to attempt to interfere with the 
administration of the tax laws by forcible interference or forcible rescue of seized property). 
 211. Stark, supra note 49, at 119; Stalans, Smith & Kinsey, supra note 39, at 482. 
 212. I.R.C. § 6702 (2000) (imposing a $500 penalty on returns filed that do not contain 
information allowing determination of the correctness of a self-assessment or that on its face is 
incorrect and is based on frivolous positions or a desire to delay or impede tax administration). 
 213. Id. § 6673 (allowing the Tax Court to impose a penalty of up to $25,000 against a 
taxpayer who litigates a position solely for delay). Other civil penalties are also available. Id. § 
6651(a)(2) (imposing a civil penalty for failure to pay tax due); id. § 6654 (imposing a civil penalty 
on an individual for failure to pay estimated taxes); id. § 6656 (imposing a penalty for failure to 
make required tax deposits); id. § 6662 (imposing a penalty on underpayments); id. § 6663 
(imposing a penalty on underpayments attributable to fraud); id. § 6672 (imposing a penalty for 
failure to collect and pay over tax or attempting to evade tax); id. § 6682 (imposing a penalty of 
$500 for each false statement an individual makes with respect to withholding); id. § 6700 (imposing 
a penalty for promoting abusive tax shelters); id. § 6701 (imposing a penalty for aiding and abetting 
the understatement of a tax liability); id. § 6702 (imposing a penalty for the filing of a frivolous tax 
return); id. § 6704 (imposing a penalty for failure to maintain the required tax records); id. § 6721 
(imposing a penalty for failure to file correct information returns); id. § 6722 (imposing a penalty for 
failure to provide correct payee statements); id. § 6723 (imposing a penalty for failure to comply 
with other information reporting requirements). Criminal sanctions are also available. 
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Some people will engage in disobedient behavior even though there is a 
strong likelihood of being fined. For instance, people have engaged in 
war protests, even when they knew that there would be a fine for failure 
to obtain a proper permit. They still protest because they believe that 
their message is more important than the possible sanction.214
B. Civil Penalties Assessed by the IRS for Frivolous Positions 
There are several civil penalties that the Service may assess against 
taxpayers. One penalty frequently assessed against tax protestors is the 
frivolous return penalty, which authorizes the Service to impose a $500 
penalty when a return is filed that: 
(A) does not contain information on which the substantial 
correctness of the self-assessment may be judged, or 
(B) contains information that on its face indicates that the self-
assessment is substantially incorrect; and 
(2) the conduct referred to . . . is due to— 
(A) a position that is frivolous, or 
(B) a desire (which appears on the purported return) to delay or 
impede the administration of Federal income tax laws.215
The Service often imposes the frivolous return penalty when 
taxpayers file zero returns, indicating that they have no taxable income 
and are entitled to a refund of any tax withheld.216 Congress enacted this 
penalty because of its concern about increasing numbers of tax 
protestors.217
 214. See, e.g., Galvin v. Hay, 374 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming the denial of a march 
permit where the applicant had not satisfied the requirement to agree not to engage in civil 
disobedience in the days following the Rodney King verdict and dismissing the claims under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act and a Bivens claim resulting from the demonstrators arrest). See generally 
Robert P. Lawry, Ethics in the Shadow of the Law: The Political Obligation of a Citizen, 52 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 655 (2002) (discussing the moral obligation of an individual in light of unjust or 
unethical laws). 
 215. Id. § 6702(a). 
 216. See, e.g., Ray v. United States, 291 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (2003); see also I.R.M. 20.1.10.9; 
Turner v. Comm’r, 88 T.C.M. (CCH) 412  (2004). 
 217. S. REP. NO. 97-494, at 74, 277 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 781, 1023–25. 
The Senate Finance Committee report indicates the following: 
The committee is concerned with the rapid growth in deliberate defiance of the tax laws 
by tax protestors. The Internal Revenue Service had 13,600 illegal protest returns under 
examination as of June 30, 1981. Many of these protestors are induced to file protest 
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Unlike most other current civil tax penalties, the frivolous return 
penalty can be imposed in addition to other penalties.218 Because it does 
not adequately deter the assertion of frivolous positions,219 proposals 
have been introduced during recent Congressional sessions that would 
increase the frivolous return penalty to $5,000.220 Another proposal 
would impose a $5,000 penalty on frivolous submissions.221 The 
proposals do not go far enough. 
Another penalty often applied to tax protestors’ returns is the 
accuracy-related penalty of I.R.C. section 6662. This is a twenty percent 
penalty that is imposed when there is an understatement of tax on a 
return that is due to negligence or disregard of rules or regulations, or a 
substantial understatement of tax.222 A substantial understatement is an 
understatement of more than ten percent of the tax or $5,000.223 A 
taxpayer is not subject to the accuracy-related penalty if the taxpayer can 
establish that he or she had reasonable cause for the understatement and 
acted in good faith.224
In more egregious cases of underreported tax liability, a civil fraud 
penalty may be imposed. The civil fraud penalty is a seventy-five percent 
penalty applied to the portion of the underpayment that is attributable to 
fraud.225 Imposition of the fraud penalty requires a much higher level of 
culpability than does imposition of the negligence or substantial 
understatement penalty; it requires proof of intent to evade tax.226 
returns through the criminal conduct of others. These advisors frequently emphasize the 
lack of any penalty when sufficient tax has been withheld from wages and encourage 
others to play the “audit lottery.” The committee believes that an immediately assessable 
penalty on the filing of protest returns will help deter the filing of such returns, and will 
demonstrate the determination of the Congress to maintain the integrity of the income tax 
system. 
Id. 
 218. I.R.C. § 6702(b). 
 219. Many tax protestors repeatedly file tax returns taking frivolous positions, despite the 
imposition of the frivolous return penalty on each return. See, e.g., Lovell v. United States, 755 F.2d 
517 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 220. See, e.g., United States Tax Court Modernization Act, S. 661, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 221. Tax Relief Act of 2005, S. 2020, § 523, 109th Cong. (2005).  This penalty would apply to 
frivolous submissions in CDP and Offers in Compromise, among other areas. Id. 
 222. I.R.C. § 6662(a). 
 223. Id. § 6662(d). The accuracy related penalty is not available for substantial understatement 
if the taxpayer had substantial authority for the position or the position was disclosed on the tax 
return. Id. § 6662(d)(2)(B). 
 224. Id. § 6664(c). 
 225. Id. § 6663(a). 
 226. SALTZMAN, supra note 165, ¶ 7B.02. 
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Another difference between the civil fraud penalty and other civil 
penalties is that the Service bears the burden of proof.227
In addition to the penalties that may be imposed on a taxpayer for her 
return positions, penalties can be imposed on promoters of frivolous 
positions. A $1,000 penalty per document may be imposed against a 
person 
(1) who aids or assists in, procures, or advises with respect to, the 
preparation or presentation of any portion of a return, affidavit, claim, 
or other document, 
(2) who knows (or has reason to believe) that such portion will be used 
in connection with any material matter arising under the internal 
revenue laws, and 
(3) who knows that such portion (if so used) would result in an 
understatement of the liability for tax of another person.228
In addition to the penalties that can be asserted by the Service, as 
discussed below, the courts can also assert a number of penalties against 
taxpayers who take frivolous positions and use the judicial system to 
delay collection of their taxes. 
C. Civil Penalties Imposed by the Courts 
Courts can impose penalties on vexatious litigants, including tax 
protestors, pursuant to statutory authority, judicial rule, and the court’s 
inherent powers. Even courts of limited jurisdiction, such as the Tax 
Court, have inherent power to impose sanctions on frivolous litigants.229 
The inherent power to impose sanctions promotes “the due and orderly 
administration of justice and [maintains] the authority and dignity of the 
court.”230 Although it is not a common remedy, courts can charge a 
frivolous litigant for the costs incurred by her opponent when the 
litigation was instituted “in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for 
oppressive reasons.”231
 227. Id. 
 228. I.R.C. § 6701. 
 229. Charczuk v. Comm’r, 771 F.2d 471, 475 (10th Cir. 1985). 
 230. Roadway Exp., Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980) (quoting Cooke v. United States, 
267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925)). 
 231. Id. at 766 (quoting F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 
116, 129 (1974)). 
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The courts are often understandably reluctant to impose penalties on 
pro se litigants. However, many courts have overcome this reluctance in 
the case of tax protestors because of the burden they place on the 
courts.232 Many courts have warned current and future litigants that 
certain positions will be penalized in future cases.233 Unfortunately, the 
willingness to impose penalties does not address the problem of 
inconsistent application. 
1. The Tax Court 
The Tax Court is authorized to impose a penalty of up to $25,000 on 
taxpayers 
(1) Whenever it appears to the Tax Court that― 
(A) proceedings before it have been instituted or maintained by the 
taxpayer primarily for delay, 
(B) the taxpayer’s position in such proceeding is frivolous or 
groundless, or 
(C) the taxpayer unreasonably failed to pursue available 
administrative remedies234
These penalties have been regularly imposed on tax protestors.235 
Before imposing a section 6673(a) sanction in a particular context, the 
Tax Court often warns future litigants that it will impose penalties.236 
 232. See, e.g., Parker v. Comm’r 117 F.2d 785, 787 (5th Cir. 1997) (imposing the requested 
$2,000 sanction after stating that “[a]lthough some latitude may be afforded to pro se taxpayers who 
misunderstand the nature of the tax laws, pro se status is not a license to litter the dockets of the 
federal courts with allegations that the Internal Revenue Code is the product of an illegal 
conspiracy.”); Miller v. United States, 868 F.2d 236, 242 (7th Cir. 1989) (affirming the district 
court’s imposition of sanctions and imposing more for a the filing of a frivolous appeal); Connor v. 
Comm’r, 770 F.2d 17, 20 (2nd Cir. 1985) (imposing Rule 38 sanctions); Depew v. United States, 50 
F. Supp. 2d 1009 (D. Colo. 1999); Birth v. United States, 782 F. Supp. 289, 292 (M.D. Pa. 1992) 
(imposing $3,000 in Rule 11 sanctions). 
 233. See, e.g., Marino v. Brown, 357 F.3d 143, 147 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting a prior warning and 
issuing a further warning); Roat v. Comm’r, 847 F.2d 1379, 1384 (9th Cir. 1988); Zuger v. United 
States, 834 F.2d 1009, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Lefebvre v. Comm’r, 830 F.2d 417, 421 (1st Cir. 
1987) (warning future pro se litigants against making the same arguments); Steward v. Comm’r, 90 
T.C.M. (CCH) 269 (2005) (warning specifically directed to taxpayer against future frivolous 
arguments). 
 234. I.R.C. § 6673(a) (2000). 
 235. See, e.g., Keene v. Comm’r, 121 T.C. 8 (2003); Nestor v. Comm’r, 118 T.C. 162 (2002). 
 236. Pierson v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 576, 581 (2000) (warning future CDP litigants of the 
availability of section 6673(a) penalties). Copies of Pierson have been provided to many taxpayers 
pursuing CDP claims and asserting tax protestor positions. 
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Even when a court dismisses a case for lack of jurisdiction, the court can 
impose penalties,237 which may be important when a tax protestor 
institutes proceedings for purposes of delay. 
While this penalty is substantial, it is discretionary in both 
application and amount. Such discretion means that similarly situated 
taxpayers may ultimately receive different results. More uniform 
application could increase the perception of fairness. 
2. The district courts and federal court of claims 
The penalty for frivolous litigation available under I.R.C. section 
6673(a)(1) is limited to imposition by the Tax Court. This means that the 
district courts are left solely with their inherent power and Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 11 to sanction intransigent taxpayers. Because many 
tax protestors are pro se litigants, the courts may be hesitant to impose 
Rule 11 sanctions. This is particularly the case where the government 
fails to ask the court to impose Rule 11 sanctions.238 As with I.R.C. 
section 6673 penalties, Rule 11 sanctions can be imposed even if a case 
is later dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.239
It is important that the district courts and the federal court of claims 
have the ability to impose significant penalties on tax protestors even 
though these courts’ jurisdiction over tax litigation is generally limited to 
refund jurisdiction. In addition to refund claims, tax protestors often file 
suit in district courts when the IRS asserts a deficiency,240 claiming that 
the United States Tax Court is not a legitimate court. The burden on the 
judicial system is also increased by claims filed by tax protestors seeking 
to enjoin tax collection, which are often filed despite the Anti-Injunction 
Act’s prohibition against such suits.241
 237. See, e.g., Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131 (1992). 
 238. See, e.g., Lindsey v. United States, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-2257 (D. Nev. 2003) (upholding 
determination to proceed with collection of frivolous return penalties and granting the requested 
$1,242 in attorneys fees as a sanction under the court’s inherent power, but noting that a $2,500 
sanction would have been appropriate); Carrillo v. United States, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-1608 (D. Nev. 
2003); Waller v. United States, 90 A.F.T.R.2d 2002-6759 (D. Nev. 2002); Blanchard v. United 
States, 90 A.F.T.R.2d 2002-6640 (D. Nev. 2002). In many cases before the district courts, the IRS 
has not asked the court to impose sanctions on a taxpayer who has only sought delay or raised 
frivolous arguments. 
 239. See Willy, 503 U.S. at 132. 
 240. See, e.g., Purk v. I.R.S., 1990 WL 10692 (6th Cir. 1990). 
 241. See, e.g., Hezel v. United States, 82 A.F.T.R.2d 98-6405 (6th Cir. 1998). 
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Because I.R.C. section 6673(a)(1) penalties cannot be imposed by 
the district courts or the court of claims,242 the amount and nature of the 
penalties imposed by the court may depend on whether a taxpayer brings 
a prepayment suit in the Tax Court or a refund claim in the district court 
or court of claims. Since the jurisdiction of these courts is not 
coextensive, this difference in treatment, based entirely on the court in 
which the case is brought, may result in the perception that taxpayers are 
treated differently. This may seem unfair to some taxpayers. 
3. The courts of appeals 
By statute, the courts of appeals can impose sanctions on litigants 
and attorneys.243 The party losing an appeal may be required to pay “just 
damages” and single or double costs resulting from the delay.244 An 
additional statute provides that 
[a]ny attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any 
court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so 
multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and 
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the 
excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred 
because of such conduct.245
Both statutes have been used against tax protestors.246
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 allows the court of appeals 
to impose sanctions on litigants who bring frivolous appeals. These 
sanctions are often imposed on tax protestors.247 Although in some cases 
 
 242. I.R.C. section 6673 has limited application outside the Tax Court. Other courts may 
assess an I.R.C. section 6673 penalty of up to $10,000 only for frivolous or groundless proceedings 
under I.R.C. section 7433, which permits actions for certain unauthorized collection actions. I.R.C. § 
6673(b)(1) (2000). 
 243. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1912, 1927 (2000). 
 244. Id. § 1912. 
 245. Id. § 1927. 
 246. See, e.g., Raft v. Comm’r, 95 A.F.T.R.2d 2005-2652 (6th Cir. 2005) (applying 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1927 and FED. R. APP. P. 38 to impose sanctions on the attorney in a tax protestor case); 
Sawukaytis v. Comm’r, 102 Fed. Appx. 29 (6th Cir. 2005) (granting sanctions against a tax protestor 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1912, even after noting the desire to use sanction sparingly to avoid chilling 
possibly meritorious appeals); Marino v. Brown, 357 F.3d 143 (1st Cir. 2004) (imposing sanctions 
on a tax protestor under 28 U.S.C. § 1912 and FED. R. APP. P. 38); Stoecklin v. United States, 865 
F.2d 1221 (11th Cir. 1989) (imposing sanction against a tax protestor under 28 U.S.C. § 1912). 
 247. See, e.g., Stafford v. United States, 208 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 2000) (awarding the 
government $4,000 in sanctions against a tax protestor); United States v. Ins. Consultants of Knox, 
Inc., 187 F.3d 755 (7th Cir. 1999) (ordering $2,000 sanction against tax protestor and corporation for 
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the courts of appeals have been willing to impose significant sanctions, 
including attorneys fees awards on taxpayers whose entire arguments are 
based on tax-protestor rhetoric,248 the amount of the sanction is likely to 
be low compared to the cost to the system resulting from a frivolous 
appeal. 
Even more troubling is the fact that the amounts are likely to be 
inconsistent from one tax protestor to the next and from one circuit to 
another, depending on nothing more than the court or judges before 
which the case is presented. Sanctions are discretionary, and therefore, 
the court of appeals is not required to impose sanctions in any particular 
case.249 Although there may be less willingness on the part of the courts 
of appeals to impose penalties because tax protestors often represent 
themselves, the courts of appeals have imposed sanction in tax protestor 
cases with some frequency.250
D. Effect of Penalties on Tax Protestor Behavior 
There is little data on the effect that civil penalties generally have on 
tax compliance.251 However, case after case demonstrates that the 
current penalties do not deter the tax-protestor arguments. That the 
current penalties do not adequately deter tax protestors is demonstrated 
by the fact some tax protestors engage in multiple litigations, undeterred 
by prior failed litigation.252 Even summary disposition of these cases 
imposes significant systemic cost. 
In addition to the imposition of penalties, the IRS and the 
Department of Justice have a number of initiatives designed to slow the 
which protestor served as an officer unless they could show cause why such a sanction should not be 
imposed). 
 248. See, e.g., Hudson v. United States, 766 F.2d 1288, 1292 (9th Cir. 1985) (awarding the 
IRS attorneys fees and double costs). 
 249. 16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3984.1 (3d ed. 2005). 
 250. Id. 
 251. See Stark, supra note 49, at 116. 
 252. See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 868 F.2d 236, 239 (1989) (noting that this was an 
appeal from previous challenges brought by the same taxpayer that raised the same tax protestor 
arguments relating to the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, despite the prior imposition of 
sanctions); Wright v. Comm’r, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 546 (1990) (noting that the same taxpayer had 
brought the same frivolous tax protestor claims to the Tax Court on four prior occasions, in each of 
which the Tax Court awarded the government $5,000 damages under I.R.C. section 6673); 
Trohimovich v. Comm’r, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 1109 (1989) (referencing Trohimovich v. Comm’r, 776 
F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1985), which states that the taxpayers had “filed at least fifteen tax-related appeals 
in this court since July, 1979”); see also  Trohimovich v. Comm’r 77 T.C. 252 (1981). 
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growth of the tax protestor movement. One approach uses judicial action 
against the promoters of tax protestor schemes. Sanctions against 
promoters include civil remedies (primarily injunctions) and criminal 
charges.253 Injunctions have been successful in preventing specific 
individuals from promoting abusive tax schemes.254 Between 2001 and 
April, 2005, the IRS obtained over 100 injunctions against promoters of 
illegal tax schemes.255
Another approach is education. The Service is using a number of 
methods to educate the public about illegal tax schemes, such as making 
a variety of resources available on the IRS website256 and appealing to 
the media and other public outlets. However, such efforts have not 
sufficiently reduced the number of illegal tax schemes or tax protestor 
filings. Therefore, additional mechanisms and initiatives to reduce the 
spread of illegal tax schemes and the promotion of tax protestor rhetoric 
are needed.  
VI. PENALTIES AS SYSTEMIC COMPENSATION 
A. The Costs and the Problem 
As has been demonstrated, conventional approaches do not stop tax 
protestors from delaying tax collection and tying up the courts.257 
Neither civil penalties nor criminal prosecution have slowed the growth 
of the tax protestor movement. Moreover, penalties are often imposed 
inconsistently. A different approach is needed to compensate the system 
for the costs imposed by tax protestors’ frivolous arguments and to deter 
others from converting to the tax protestor movement. In addition, the 
justification of deterring such behavior as the reason to impose penalties 
 253. Criminal indictments in 2005 against promoters of tax scams are up fifty-seven percent. 
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Notes Increase in Tax Enforcement (April 26, 
2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/tax/txdv05167.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2005). 
 254. Monica Langley, Consultant Leads Secret Double Life as Internet Sleuth, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 10, 2004, at A1 (discussing the role of an individual in ferreting out tax protestor schemes and 
the role she played in calling into question Irwin Schiff’s insanity defense). 
 255. Press Release, Internal Revenue Service, FS 2005-15, IRS Obtains More Than 100 
Injunctions Against Tax Scheme Promoters (April 2005), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=137831,00.html. Because of increased efforts to prevent 
the promotion of tax scams, in 2004 the number of indictments against promoters of illegal tax 
schemes increased fifty-seven percent over the prior year. Id. 
 256. See Internal Revenue Service, Tax Scams—How to Recognize and Avoid Them, 
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=106788,00.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2005). 
 257. See supra Part IV.D. 
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does not stand up to the evidence that the current penalties do not 
adequately deter. However, care must be taken to avoid signaling that 
others may ignore their tax obligation without consequence, which might 
reduce the incentive to comply with tax obligations.258 As the Tax Court 
has noted, “[B]y filing cases of this type, the protesters add to the 
caseload of the Court . . . and such cases increase the expenses of 
conducting this Court and the operations of the IRS, which expenses 
must eventually be borne by all of us.”259
To effectively deter tax protestor behavior without reducing 
incentive to comply with tax obligations, when costs are incurred 
because an individual is pursuing a truly frivolous and repeatedly 
rejected position, the costs should be borne by the person who caused 
them. Compliant taxpayers should not bear the costs of protestors’ 
refusal to pay tax; this may make the system appear less fair and cause 
some currently compliant taxpayer to stop complying. As the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals noted, “When the legal system depends on 
honest compliance as much as the income tax system does—and when 
disobedience is potentially rewarding to those affected by the rule—it is 
often necessary to impose steep penalties on those who refuse to 
comply.”260 Penalties should be imposed on tax protestors who make 
frivolous arguments, not only to punish them but also to compensate for 
the damage their actions cause to the tax system and its public 
perception. Before examining this proposal in depth, consider the 
following costs associated with the tax protestor movement. 
Systemic costs resulting from tax protestor tactics include the use of 
IRS collection and litigation resources and the diversion of attention 
from legitimate issues of tax administration. IRS resources are used to 
identify, pursue, and often litigate cases against taxpayers raising 
frivolous positions; thus, the IRS is prevented from directing those 
resources to identify tax shelters, find tax evaders, and properly 
administer the tax laws. Furthermore, cases that are litigated in the 
district courts also require the involvement of the Department of Justice. 
When tax protestors litigate, judicial resources are diverted from 
legitimate cases, causing delays in justice for litigants in legitimate cases. 
In the Tax Court, this delay means that the delayed taxpayers with a 
 
 258. Kornhauser, supra note 33, at 1000. 
 259. Pierson v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 576, 581 (2000) (quoting Hatfield v. Comm’r, 68 T.C. 895, 
899 (1977)). 
 260. Coleman v. Comm’r, 791 F.2d 68, 69 (7th Cir. 1986). 
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colorable claim will be subject to greater interest accruals.261 The district 
courts, which have refund jurisdiction in tax cases,262 also have 
jurisdiction over a wide variety of civil and criminal cases. Time taken 
by tax protestors prevents the courts from expeditiously deciding other 
cases. This is unfair to criminal defendants and can be costly to civil 
litigants. 
Although the cost of the use of judicial, IRS, and Department of 
Justice personnel can be reduced to a monetary value, not all costs can be 
measured in dollars. For instance, it is impossible to determine the cost to 
other litigants whose cases may be indirectly delayed as a result of the 
pursuit of frivolous claims by others. However, this is a common 
problem in compensating victims for wrongs—money is often an 
imperfect measure of damages, but it is often the only measure available. 
Tax protestors impose enormous costs on the tax system, and their 
behavior is not deterred by current penalties. As previously noted, two 
similar tax protestors may be penalized differently; such inconsistent 
consequences result in horizontal inequity, and this inequity may cause 
other taxpayers to question the fairness of the system. In addition, current 
penalties do not compensate the system for the costs imposed by the tax 
protestors. 
B. Penalizing Protestors for Costs to the Tax System 
To increase the equality of treatment and improve the systemic 
results, a penalty should be imposed on tax protestors in the amount of 
the costs that they cause. These may include costs of administrative 
proceedings at the appeals office, time spent by the IRS or Department of 
Justice attorneys in preparing and trying cases in the Tax Court or district 
court and the court of appeals, and less tangible harm to other taxpayers. 
Moreover, because many tax protestors are pro se litigants, which makes 
courts uncomfortable with imposing heavy penalties, such penalties 
should be mandatory as long as the taxpayer raises an issue that is 
identified as a frivolous tax protestor argument. 
A reasonable solution to the problem associated with tax protestors 
and the costs that they impose on the government, the courts, and the 
 261. A taxpayer may stop the running of interest by making a deposit to the Treasury prior to 
assessment of the tax. I.R.C. § 6603 (2000). In many cases the taxpayer will be unable or unwilling 
to make a deposit, which often is the reason that taxpayers seek prepayment review of a deficiency 
determination. 
 262. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (2000) (granting refund jurisdiction to the district courts and the 
United States Court of Federal Claims). 
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public is the use of nondiscretionary, significant civil penalties that are 
large enough not only to compensate the system for any revenue lost and 
resources expended in collection of properly owed taxes, but also to deter 
others from engaging in similar behavior. Tax protestors often raise 
frivolous arguments at every possible opportunity.263 Courts have 
recognized that simply allowing the tax protestor an opportunity to voice 
his or her objections once will not prevent the tax protestor from coming 
back again and again with the same arguments. For instance, the Tax 
Court has noted that while “this Court . . . has in the past bent over 
backwards to indulge conscientious tax protestors with their legally 
frivolous claims, such indulgence has not served to dissuade the very 
same protestors from instituting a second frivolous suit on the same stale 
issues.”264 Therefore, deterrence alone does not justify the imposition of 
civil penalties on tax protestors. Civil penalties that allowed the 
government to recover the costs associated with pursuing collection from 
a tax protestor, which would otherwise be borne by compliant 
taxpayers,265 would justify the imposition of penalties. 
However, a penalty equal to the cost of pursuing collection and 
litigation should not be assessed in all cases. The complexity of the tax 
code means that there will inevitably be disputes as to its meaning and 
application. Raising legitimate challenges to the code, even if ultimately 
unsuccessful, should not be penalized. The proposed penalties should be 
imposed to address the costs imposed on the tax system and society as a 
result of tax protestors’ claims. 
Making penalties mandatory in cases where protestor arguments are 
used would mitigate the courts’ reluctance to impose sanctions on pro se 
litigants. The court and the Service would have the ability to warn the 
individual at the outset that the penalties would be imposed if the 
taxpayer continued to present tax protestor arguments, providing some 
flexibility and a safeguard against overzealousness. 
The contours of tax protestor rhetoric must be defined to allow 
imposition of the proposed penalty. An approach similar to that used 
against tax shelters should be used. To combat tax shelters, certain 
 263. See supra note 252 and accompanying text. 
 264. Senesi v. Comm’r, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 143, 145 (1981) (imposing I.R.C. § 6673 penalties 
and citing to prior cases where protestors had returned with the same arguments in later cases); see 
also supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text (discussing the repeated litigation involving Irwin 
Schiff). 
 265. See, e.g., Snyder v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 864, 872–73 (1980), aff’d, 647 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 
1981). 
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transactions are “listed.”266 The IRS already identifies of frivolous and 
meritless schemes and positions to inform taxpayers of positions that 
may not be taken without risk of penalty.267 In addition, the courts have 
identified numerous frivolous positions. The IRS’s list of identified 
schemes should be combined with the judicially identified frivolous 
positions to create a comprehensive list of frivolous arguments, which 
would be subject to penalties. Using such a list would provide notice to 
taxpayers of the circumstances in which they would be subject to the 
proposed penalty and would allow guidance as to the types of positions 
that are discouraged. 
Taxpayers who simply pursue aggressive positions do not pose the 
same threat to the tax system as tax protestors. One of the costs to society 
is the maintenance of the judicial system. Legitimate, but ultimately 
unsuccessful, challenges to tax issues are an appropriate use of the 
judicial and tax administration systems. Moreover, to the extent that tax 
shelter or aggressive positions are taken only because they result in a tax 
benefit that would not exist without the transactions, the available 
penalties, including the penalties that were added to the Code as a result 
of the American Jobs Creation Tax Act of 2004,268 reduce the 
profitability of these transactions and may deter many taxpayers from 
engaging in these transactions. Only those positions that are completely 
without merit and have no basis in law, i.e., the truly frivolous positions, 
should be subject to this new penalty. In other words, taxpayers should 
not be subject to these penalties simply because they do not succeed at 
audit, in the IRS Office of Appeals, or in court. Rather, only taxpayers 
who raise and pursue frivolous positions should be subject to additional 
penalties. 
The proposed penalty is analogous to allowing taxpayers to recover 
litigation costs from the IRS when the taxpayer has established that she 
exhausted all administrative remedies and that the IRS’s position was not 
 266. I.R.S. Notice 2004-67, 2004-41 I.R.B. 600 (identifying thirty transactions that must be 
reported if engaged in by a taxpayer during the tax year). 
 267. A number of resources and information on abusive tax scheme and frivolous arguments 
are available on the IRS web site, available at http://www.irs.gov/businesses/ 
small/article/0,,id=106788,00.html and http://www.irs.gov/compliance/enforcement/ 
article/0,,id=121259,00.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2005). These could be compiled into one or more 
notices to identify the arguments that will be pursued and subject to additional penalties as tax 
protestor arguments. 
 268. American Jobs Creation Tax Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-357, §§ 811, 812, 818, 821; 118 
Stat. 1418, 108th Cong. 2nd Sess. (2004) (codified in various sections of the I.R.C.). 
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substantially justified.269 The proposed penalty would allow the 
government to recover its costs, both administrative and judicial. 
As Part III demonstrates, the arguments that are used by tax 
protestors are not supported by legitimate legal arguments. However, it is 
possible for tax protestors to have a colorable claim for no imposition of 
tax mixed in with frivolous positions. Additionally, simply judging a 
claim on its face to be a protestor claim may result in treating inarticulate 
taxpayers as tax protestors, which is problematic if the claims made by 
protestors are dismissed out of hand. 
Maintaining a high compliance rate requires that the majority of the 
affected population believe that the system is fair so that they will 
continue to self-report their tax liability. Coupling the possibility of a 
legitimate claim mingled with tax protestor rhetoric, or inarticulate 
claims that appear to be tax protestor claims, with the need for the tax 
system to appear to be fair, suggests that simply dismissing tax protestor 
claims without consideration would be ill-advised. Notwithstanding the 
need to allow a reasonable review of all claims, even if they appear to be 
protestor claims, the costs of that review should not be borne by the 
majority of taxpayers who do not subscribe to such views and who 
voluntarily comply with their tax obligations. 
Tax protestors must be permitted to have access to the administrative 
and judicial review functions of the tax administration system. However, 
to the extent that the claims that they raise are identified as frivolous, 
meritless tax protestor positions, the individual raising and pursuing such 
claims should bear the burden of those claims. Therefore, penalties equal 
to the costs of personnel and overhead to pursue collection both judicial 
and administrative should be mandatorily imposed on tax protestors 
when their claims are, indeed, frivolous. 
C. Application of New Penalties to Tax Protestors 
Tax-enforcement resources are limited and not all tax protestors will 
be able to pay their tax liabilities, let alone penalties. However, to the 
extent possible, resources should be directed to collecting taxes from all 
taxpayers with liabilities who can pay. As noted above, many protestor 
converts have above-average income and education.270 Thus, for many 
protestors imposing additional penalties will not be meaningless. It will 
 269. I.R.C. § 7430(a), (b) (2000). 
 270. See supra notes 42, 77–83 and accompanying text. 
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only be meaningless if the Service cannot or will not pursue collection of 
their tax liabilities.271
Of concern is the number of opportunities that are available for tax 
protestors to put forward frivolous positions. Not only do tax protestors 
have the traditional forums in which they can raise frivolous arguments, 
post-RRA 1998, tax protestors can use a CDP hearing as another 
opportunity to present frivolous claims.272 However, CDP hearings and 
appeals should be dealt with expeditiously, with additional penalties 
imposed for frivolous arguments.273
Litigation or administrative appeals brought by tax protestors should 
not be automatically dismissed. However, many tax protestor cases can 
be concluded expeditiously through a motion either to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or for 
summary judgment. Although in most tax protestor cases it is unlikely 
that there will be a meritorious issue, tax protestors can raise legitimate 
claims.274 However, if no legitimate issue is present, rapid disposition of 
tax-protestor cases will reduce the amount of judicial resources needed 
but will not make these cases cost-free. The Service will still need to 
expend a substantial amount of time to draft, serve, and present motions 
and responses. This time takes away from the efforts the Service can 
direct to other areas of tax administration. Imposing significant penalties 
that make up for the costs imposed by tax protestor arguments will solve 
concerns both that the tax protestor is unfairly burdening the tax 
collection and judicial systems and that the tax collection and judicial 
 271. Immediately following the enactment of RRA 1998, enforcement activity declined 
substantially. Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income, 1999 IRS Data Book Table 21, 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/99db21co.xls (last visited Dec. 20, 2005) (reporting that 
in fiscal year 1998, before RRA 1998 became effective, IRS enforcement activity consisted of 
383,000 Notices of Lien issued, 2,503,000 Notices of Levy on third parties issued, and 2,259 
seizures conducted; and in fiscal year 1999, following effective date of RRA 1998, IRS enforcement 
activity consisted of 168,000 Notices of Lien issued, 504,000 Notices of Levy on third parties 
issued, and 161 seizures conducted). Recently, enforcement has been increased and the IRS intends 
to increase enforcement even more. Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income, from 2004 IRS 
Data Book, tbl. 16, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/04db16co.xls (last visited Dec. 20, 
2005) (reporting that in fiscal year 2004 the IRS enforcement activity consisted of 534,392, 
2,029,613, and 440, Notices of Lien issued, Notices of Levy issued to third parties, and seizures, 
respectively). 
 272. I.R.C. § 6330 (entitling taxpayers to a CDP hearing prior to levy on their property). 
 273. See Danshera Cords, Collection Due Process: The Scope and Nature of Judicial Review, 
73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021 (2005). 
 274. See Lunsford v. Comm’r, 117 T.C. 183 (2001) (challenging the appeals officer’s failure 
to conduct a hearing, in addition to raising more of the traditional tax protestor arguments); Cords, 
supra note 72, at 65, 101. 
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systems must listen to the concerns of taxpayers, even if they are 
unlikely to warrant action. 
Because one of the concerns that this proposal addresses is the 
concern that the tax system must be perceived as fair, warning should be 
given to taxpayers who assert the identified tax protestor claims before 
the imposition of penalties. After that warning is given, penalties should 
include the cost of administrative and court personnel as well as 
overhead used to pursue collection of the tax liability. In addition, 
because there is always a cost-benefit analysis required in deciding how 
to allocate resources, more resources should be devoted to those that 
have sufficient assets to pay their liability. 
As has been demonstrated, current penalties have not effectively 
deterred tax protestors. In addition, a new penalty is also unlikely to 
convert dedicated tax protestors. However, if penalties are high enough, 
other, compliant taxpayers may not be tempted to convert. In addition, 
compliant taxpayers will not bear the burden of both the unpaid share of 
the government’s revenue and the cost of pursuing collection. Individuals 
who have assets with which to pay their taxes will bear the cost that they 
impose on the government for their illegitimate refusal to pay taxes. 
D. Use of Penalties Collected 
 Identifying and pursuing collection from more tax protestors may 
require that additional resources be directed to tax enforcement. Using 
enforcement to increase compliance requires a greater enforcement 
budget. Without a significant and unlikely increase in the Service’s 
budget, additional funds will come out of existing budgets, which may 
reduce customer service.275 New sources of revenue will be needed. The 
proposed penalties could be used for this purpose. Although there would 
be significant benefits, there are also several concerns. First, allowing 
penalties imposed on tax protestors to go directly to the Service may 
cause disproportionate resources to be directed to tax protestors. Second, 
in some instances the penalties could be high relative to the liability, 
which may cause courts to resist imposing or upholding the penalties. 
Finally, providing another revenue source for the IRS could result in 
dangerous funding cuts for this unpopular but essential agency. 
 275. NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERVICE, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, 
Preface at vii, 8 (2004). The IRS responds that it is not compromising service for compliance and 
enforcement activities. Id. 
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Because of these concerns, the revenue raised by penalties imposed 
on tax protestors should be treated like other penalties and included in 
tax revenue. This would not fund additional efforts to increase tax 
compliance but would alleviate the concerns generated by directing 
penalties to the Service, which could cause a perception of unfairness 
and undermine the purpose of the penalty. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Voluntary compliance is essential to the efficient and effective 
collection of revenue by any government. Allowing certain members of 
the society to avoid their obligation to contribute to the government, 
simply because they engage in dilatory tactics, is not an acceptable 
option. If some succeed, and their success is known, others may be 
encouraged to engage in the same behavior. Moreover, it is unfair that 
the majority bear the costs to the system resulting from tax protestors’ 
use of frivolous positions. 
Tax protestors cannot be shut out of the system entirely because 
others might then fear that they too would be excluded. Tax protestors 
will, on occasion, raise valid complaints. Shutting protestors out of the 
tax dispute systems would diminish the perception of fairness of the 
system. Because fairness of the system is an essential component to 
voluntary tax compliance, it should be encouraged, even at a cost. On the 
other hand, it is unfair to impose the costs of frivolous positions on those 
who comply. 
The current penalty provisions do not adequately deter tax protestor 
behavior and tax protestors cannot be shut out of either the 
administrative or judicial system; therefore, additional penalties must be 
imposed. Tax protestors impose costs at the administrative level when 
they demand that the IRS and its employees prove to them that income 
taxes are constitutional, legally enforceable obligations. These costs are 
exacerbated when the tax protestor seeks review of the liability, either 
before payment by petitioning the Tax Court, or after payment, which 
may have occurred through seizure or mandatory withholding, in the 
district courts. Judicial review expends administrative resources 
defending the Service’s determinations and collection actions and 
judicial resources in addressing motions and trying cases. The costs that 
may be incurred in pursuing collection and defending tax deficiency 
determinations and collection decisions have been increased with the 
adoption of CDP rights. Imposing nondiscretionary penalties on 
frivolous arguments will protect the system from both the concerns that 
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some will be shut out of the system and that others will have to bear the 
cost of the frivolous arguments. The amount of the penalty should be the 
amount of the costs incurred by the Service and the courts to collect the 
taxes, interest and other penalties owed. 
 
